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 This is an updated version of an article originally published in 35 Idea, at 79-128 (1994). If you are neither a 
lawyer nor a law student, you should start with more basic U.S. patent, trademark and copyright information 
also available at this website. 
Footnotes are linked, but you may find it useful to open another browser window to have related notes and text 
adjacent to one another. 
Since its initial publication, this discussion has often been revised. While U.S. IP law changes ever-more 
frequently, many changes are of little significance in the grand scheme of things. For example, the term of 
copyright has been increased by 20 years, and the copyright registration fee has increased by $10. Also, patent 
fees tend to change often. 
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I much appreciate frequent updating suggestions by Harold L. Burstyn, an Adjunct Professor, L. C. Smith 
College of Engineering and Computer Science, at Syracuse University, who is also Of Counsel to Milde & 




Patents, copyrights, trademarks and related interests are known as intellectual property (IP). It has not been long 
since patents especially were regarded in U.S. courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, as tools of 
monopolists, and their owners often fared poorly.[1] However, people here and abroad have come increasingly 
to view privately funded innovation as critical to national economic well-being and to agree that such innovation 
cannot occur unless companies that succeed in the marketplace can recoup their research, development and 
marketing costs. That is a major function of IP, and, particularly since the 1980s, IP has been seen as playing a 
key global role in developing technologies for the next century.[2] 
Each part of IP law is quite complex in itself. At FPLC, a wide array of courses now cover practice before the U.
S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in patent cases, substantive patent and trade secret law, copyrights, 
trademarks and unfair competition, and IP licensing -- as well as international, comparative and business-related 
topics. Still, articles such as this[3] and survey courses can play an important role. Because IP issues arise in 
many common transactions, most lawyers should have a grasp of the basics. Those who wish to specialize 
should also appreciate that basics lay a foundation for grasping cumulative and alternative strategic value of IP 
options. These cannot be evaluated in isolation, as in more detailed written treatments or advanced courses. 
In approaching IP most broadly, it is critical to appreciate the extent to which competition is preeminent in U.S. 
law. Ironically, some of the strongest evidence of its importance appears in IP cases.[4] Thus, notwithstanding 
renewed or possibly expanded recognition of the value of IP in encouraging innovation, IP owners must 
understand that anything that prevents others from selling products or services will be limited and strictly 
scrutinized. 
From this perspective, patent, copyright and trade secret protection comprise but one of two major branches of 
IP law.[5] In stark contrast, the other major branch of IP law is designed to ensure that competition is on the 
merits. Such law, designed to prevent source confusion and damage to commercial reputations generally cannot 
be used to prevent competition in goods and services. 
As explained in more detail below, forms of protection falling within the first branch (work products) may be 
used to prevent others from, e.g., making or selling protected products or services. Based on a Constitutional 
provision,[6] patents and copyrights are of limited duration and governed almost exclusively by federal law. 
Trade secrets are theoretically unlimited in duration and governed mostly by state law. 
Of the three, patents offer the strongest possible protection. They can be used to prevent others from, e.g, using 
or selling covered technology -- even if it was independently created. Yet, they cost thousands of dollars, are 
difficult to obtain, last (subject to possible extensions to compensate for various kinds of delays) only twenty 
years from when an application is first filed, are only useful after issue, and only in the country where issued. 
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Among other things, subject matter must usually be both objectively novel and unobvious to those familiar with 
relevant technology. 
Copyrights, however, may last to 70 years beyond an author's lifetime and are much more easily and cheaply 
obtained. A subjectively novel work is protected (even beyond U.S. borders) as soon as it is "fixed" or somehow 
recorded. A $30 registration fee [$45 after July 1, 2006] need be paid only if one wants to sue. Yet, copyrights 
are somewhat weaker than patents because independently created, identical works do not infringe. This 
difference, however, may be more theoretical than real when defendants must convince courts that they did not 
copy publicly available works. Possibly because of this, Congress and the courts have tried to ensure that 
copyrights cover different subject matter.[7] Still, copyrights and patents are often complementary.[8] 
Trade secret protection, as reflected in its name, protects works that can be and are kept secret. Maintaining 
secrecy is often expensive; for some works, it is impossible. Protection is weaker than that afforded by either 
patents or copyrights because rights are not infringed if competitors copy publicly available works (reverse 
engineer). Yet, secrecy is often an important option. In the case of, e.g., manufacturing processes, patent 
infringement may be impossible to detect and secrecy is not only possible but also may be preferred.[9] 
The second major branch of IP law (designed to ensure that competition is on the merits) allows firms to take 
action to prevent others from providing various kinds of false and misleading information to consumers. Indeed, 
accurate information makes competition possible. If consumers lack good information, including that enabling 
them to associate prior happy (or unhappy) experiences with particular firms, they receive little if any advantage 
from alternative commercial sources. 
Trademarks, or brand names, are central to this major branch of IP law. Rights in a good trademark generally 
arise automatically upon its first commercial use and have potentially unlimited duration. Although federal 
registration confers advantages, marks need not be registered. Commonlaw rights are adequate to prevent others 
from using similar marks when consumers may be deceived as to source or sponsorship of goods or services. 
While trademarks have no value in directly protecting work products, firms that treat consumers well find their 
goodwill to command justifiably higher prices. Thus, when R&D costs are not large, trademark rights may be 
adequate to recoup them. 
Until recently, most lawyers and law schools paid little attention to IP.[10] When courses have been offered,[11] 
few students have elected them.[12] Thus, what many older lawyers think they know about IP is wrong.[13] 
Hence, judges tend also to be uninformed. Lawyers trained in science or engineering have traditionally 
dominated IP practice. Yet, no particular background is needed for trademark or most copyright practice. Also, 
while technical training and passing a special examination are needed to obtain patents for others,[14] after 
patents issue, any attorney can assign, license or otherwise dispose of them -- or sue infringers. More 
importantly, attorneys with little interest in IP, or those who narrowly focus, can help assess clients' options 
before they expire and otherwise avoid major pitfalls.[15] 
Contents 
 
II. The Price of Ignorance
A. Independent Inventors and the Mousetrap Myth
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If a man can... make a better mousetrap than his neighbor, though he builds his house in the 
woods the world will make a beaten path to his door.
Most people have heard variations on the remark quoted above.[17] It is somewhat ambiguous, but many 
construe it to mean that anyone who invents a new mousetrap will be wealthy -- particularly if they can patent it. 
Well-informed patent attorneys know this as the "mousetrap myth." 
That it is a myth is illustrated by the experience of Chester M. Woolworth, president of the Animal Trap 
Company.[18] In the 1920's, the company sold a mousetrap for five cents. In 1928, Woolworth succeeded in 
improving the trap, but the improved version cost twelve cents. 
Unfortunately, Woolworth failed to consider that, once a mouse had been caught, people usually disposed of 
both mouse and trap. Apparently because consumers were obligated to clean or discard a trap costing almost two 
and one-half times as much as Woolworth's other trap, sales were low. 
A patent would not have improved the appeal of Woolworth's invention. Yet, each year, independent inventors 
spend millions of dollars on patents. If established manufacturers can make as big a mistake as Woolworth's, 
imagine the odds of commercial failure faced by those with less experience. As well summarized several years 
ago:[19] 
The inventor generally might undertake to promote his own invention in whatever manner he can and to 
whatever degree of effectiveness. After an unbusinesslike solicitation effort to various companies, resulting in 
total rejection, he understandably looks for outside help only to find there is little or none available.... Thus, 
somewhat disillusioned and perhaps embittered, it is no wonder that the typical amateur inventor is eventually 
driven into the waiting arms of the invention promoter.... In an indifferent world, the [promoter] tells the 
inventor exactly what he has been searching in vain to hear -- the promise of success in terms... he can directly 
relate to. The [promoter] preys on the inventor's intense ambition by offering him the one thing he must have to 
sustain himself -- hope. And hope, in the final analysis, is what the [promoter] is selling. 
Notwithstanding occasional action by private[20] and public parties,[21] the mousetrap myth encourages 
inventors to hear what they want to hear. Thus, promoters who promise no more than the very little most usually 
deliver will continue to thrive[22] 
Contents 
 
B. Entrepreneurs Who "Cannot Afford" IP Protection
Realizing that it is often easier to patent than to sell inventions, some entrepreneurs conclude that patent and 
related protection can be afforded only by large companies. Such people are as misinformed as independent 
inventors dazzled by the mousetrap myth. 
Let's assume that a Woolworth descendant who recently invented another mousetrap, consults an attorney about 
setting up a new business. During her visit, Ms. Woolworth also asks about patents and trademarks. The 
attorney says that he doesn't handle such things but understands that they cost thousands of dollars. Having a 
limited budget, she quickly dismisses such "expensive" notions. 
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Later, as her mousetrap moves toward production, Woolworth begins to consider possible product names and 
asks for suggestions. An employee, inspired by the cat in Disney's "Pinocchio," suggests "Figaro." Woolworth 
adopts that as her trademark. 
Having heard of her ancestor's experience, Woolworth pays careful attention to what consumers want. Her 
mousetraps sell well -- so well that, as her firm begins to break even, a larger firm closely copies them, as well 
as their instructions and labels. With better established marketing channels and other advantages, it undersells 
her by 20%. Unable to lower her price and stay in business, Woolworth consults an IP attorney. First, she learns 
that her printed material is already protected by copyright. When challenged, the competitor easily evades 
copyright liability by rewriting. Second, she learns that no patent is possible if sought more than one year after a 
product is offered for sale.[23] Third, she learns of the need to determine whether her mousetrap infringes 
another's patents. A search shows that a minor component does. A license is available but costs too much. So, 
she disposes of inventory and redesigns her product. 
Shortly thereafter, the employee who suggested "Figaro" leaves and registers the name locally. About the same 
time, Woolworth receives a letter objecting to her use of "Figaro." Because it is cheaper than litigation, she must 
write off her goodwill. Selecting, clearing and federally registering some other mark would probably would cost 
considerably less than the cost of informing consumers of the new mark.[24] 
No entrepreneur wants to use precious startup capital for legal fees. Yet, Woolworth's failure to explore others' 
rights was at least as unwise as purchasing a building without a clear title. 
Had her first lawyer been better informed, our hypothetical Woolworth would have been much better off. It 
costs little to register copyrights,[25] but this substantially alters the affordability of litigation. Also, patent costs 
could easily have been justified.[26] 
Contents 
[1] A comprehensive review of the situation appears in Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and the Patent 
Office , Ch. 3 in The Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies 143 (1968). 
[2] See, e.g., Thomas G. Field, Jr., Maximizing the Return from Genome Research, 5 Risk 95 (1994) 
(introducing a symposium on the topic); see also, papers following. 
[3] Prior versions of this paper are Intellectual and Industrial Property in a Nutshell, 77 W. V. L.Rev. 525 
(1975); Brief Survey... Patent, Trademark, Copyright, 26 Idea 57 (1985) and Brief Survey of Intellectual 
Property, 31 Idea 85 (1990). Text has often been carried forward, but each has a distinct emphasis. 
[4] See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 
Inc., 326 U.S. 249 (1945), Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, and its companion, Compco Corp. 
v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964). See also, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 506 U.S. 653 (1966). 
[5] This organization closely tracks the syllabus for my course, Fundamentals of Intellectual Property. 
[6] U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides: 
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The Congress shall have power... to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing 
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries. [Emphasis added.]
It is interesting that "science" corresponds to authors (copyrights) and "useful arts" to inventors (patents). When 
the clause was written, the former obviously meant "knowledge" and the latter "technology." The patent statute 
foreshortens "useful arts" to "art," but the word connotes technology. 
[7] See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (that a lamp base was patentable did not preclude its being 
copyrightable); see also, Appln. of Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1393 (CCPA 1974) (an applicant could have both a 
design patent and copyrights on a Spiro Agnew watch). 
[8] Id. See also generally, Brief Survey... Patent, Trademark, Copyright, supra note 3, at 89 (a proposal for 
reconciling IP options). 
[9] Compare Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489 (1974) ("In the case of trade secret law no 
reasonable risk of deterrence from patent application by those who can reasonably expect to be granted patents 
exists."). 
[10] Even in The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 1993-94, the list of intellectual property professors occupied 
only 2 pages, and those with more than 10 years of experience, less than half of a page. The list of contracts 
professors, however, ran 6.5 page, and those with more than 10 years experience occupied over 2 pages. 
By the time The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 2005-2006 was published, the list of IP professors had 
increased by 250%, whereas contracts professors had increased only 38%. 
[11] Id. 
[12] While less than half of FPLC's J.D. graduates took any intellectual property courses prior to 1990, 
enrollments have dramatically increased. About half of the first year class elects my introductory course, and 
very few obtain J.D.s without taking at least one IP course. 
[13] See Paul Goldstein, Patent, Copyright and Related State Doctrines, preface (1973). 
[14] The 1965 Agency Practice Act, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 500, provides that no other federal agency can 
require an attorney to do more than file a written declaration of representation. See also 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) 
and Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (finding that states cannot regard U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) recognized patent practitioners as engaged in the unauthorized practice of law). 
[15] Several are illustrated below. See also, e.g., my online discussion, Avoiding Patent, Trademark & 
Copyright Problems -- one in a series addressed to the needs of, e.g., artists, inventors and entrepreneurs. 
[17] Attributed to Ralph Waldo Emerson; SeeBartlett's Familiar Quotations 605a (14th ed. 1968). 
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[18] See Management Institute, Boston College School of Management, Venture Capital: A Guidebook for 
New Enterprises, 8 (U.S. Govt. Printing Office 1972). . 
[19] Richard Onanian, Invention Promoters, Invention Management, May 1979, at 3. 
[20] See, e.g., Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, 333 F.Supp. 116 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
[21] For example, in Jan. 1994, the Federal Trade Commission published Invention Promotion Firms, a 
pamphlet in its "Facts for Consumers" series. It has also filed several suits. 
Also, in 1999, a new section was added to the patent statute: 35 U.S.C § 297. Information is available at the 
PTO website. 
[22] See the ways to avoid such firms, published by a non-profit assistance program in 1996. Advice provided 
there is still worth heeding. 
[23] U.S. patents are barred for failure to apply within one year of a product's being publicly disclosed anywhere 
or offered for sale in the U.S.; 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Throughout most of the world, the right is forfeited 
immediately. 
[24] Based on American Intellectual Property Law Association, Committee on Economics of Legal Practice, 
Report of the Economic Survey 2003, 59. in 2002, the combined average charges for a search, application and 
prosecution were about $2500 -- plus PTO fees). 
[25] Based on the Economic Survey, supra , at 65, the median charge for copyright registration in 1997 was 
about $200, but the process is usually so simple that most people do it themselves. 
[26] See, e.g., my discussion Seeking Cost-Effective Patents. As recounted there, inventors can control costs in 
several ways. For example, if a novelty search is unfavorable, most further expense can be avoided. If an 
invention cannot be marketed successfully, maintenance fees need not be paid (current information about those 
and other fees is available at the PTO website). 
Contents 
 
III. Protecting Work Products
A. Patents 
1. Their origin and rationale
"Patent" is an abbreviation of "letters patent" and signifies an exclusive government grant.[27] Early U.S. 
patents gave title to tracts of land.[28] While patents discussed here have limited duration,[29] the rationale is 
similar: They encourage investment in research and development.[30] In return, those with qualifying 
innovations may exclude others[31] -- regardless of copying[32] -- until their patents expire. Moreover, anyone 
can use inventions after expiration. 
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Those who regard patents as anticompetitive should consider, e.g., that:[33] 
[T]he patent system encourages competitive effort... that would not otherwise take place. The 
television industry, for example, was for all practical purposes nonexistent a decade ago -- now it 
dwarfs the radio industry.... Yet, the industry is characterized by huge research [costs]... -- over 
$65 million in color television already and the return is yet to come. These expenditures have 
been made in anticipation of monetary return through patent license royalties. The antibiotics 
industry, limited to penicillin a decade ago, is now the scene of the most intense competition....
In spite of such arguments, the Supreme Court was especially hostile through the 1960's. It seemed to relish 
holding patents invalid. Once, Justice Jackson critically observed that the only valid patent was one that had not 
come before the Court.[34] 
In 1952, at the urging of the bar, Congress revised and codified the law. The situation was still regarded as 
unsatisfactory,[35] and the Senate began a thorough review shortly thereafter.[36] All things considered, if only 
reasonably contested patents are litigated, patentees should have about a 50-50 chance. Yet, in many 
jurisdictions patent owners rarely prevailed.[37] This led to doubts about the value of patents and, in turn, may 
have led to reduced levels of U.S. innovation. 
For about 25 years, attempts to strengthen the patent system were not viewed sympathetically. However, in the 
late 1970's, President Carter and Congress, if not also judges,[38] began to see that stronger protection might 
help address trade imbalances.[39] One of the first, and perhaps most significant, results was creation, in 1982, 
of a Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit [CAFC]. Subject only to infrequent review by the Supreme Court, 
it exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases.[40] 
Earlier, two federal courts of appeal had shared jurisdiction to review PTO decisions,[41] and all circuits had 
jurisdiction over patent litigation.[42] This arrangement, coupled with infrequent Supreme Court review, 
facilitated the application of different validity standards in obtaining and enforcing patents, as well as the 
development of diverse infringement standards.[43] 
Now, judges who review PTO decisions also consider patents in the context of infringement litigation. This 
makes it more likely that only valid patents will be granted.[44] Some may be surprised, but corporate patent 
attorneys in particular would not want it otherwise. While a firm's patents keep competitors at bay, its 
competitors' patents likewise keep it at bay! 
Moreover, CAFC decisions have led to a perception that valid patents will be enforced.[45] Thus, that Court 
may encourage settlement by eliminating wasteful forum shopping and reducing uncertainty. 
2. Kinds of patent 
Three distinct kinds of patents are available in the U.S. -- utility, design and plant, in descending order of grants. 
Utility patents are uniformly meant when "patent" is used alone. That convention is followed here. Their subject 
matter includes machines, commercial processes, compositions of matter and articles of manufacture.[46] These 
categories are not important, but subject matter has been the subject of considerable litigation.[47] Design 
patents protect ornamental features,[48] rather than the function, of articles such as containers[49] or light 
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fixtures.[50] In contrast with plant and utility patents, design patents last fourteen years from the date of grant 
instead of twenty years from first filing.[51] 
Plant patents reward discovery of previously uncultivated plants or the breeding of novel plants. However, 
asexual propagation is needed.[52] Because naturally occurring plants may be protected, the subject matter of 
plant patents need not be objectively novel.[53] This is a major distinguishing feature of plant patents; another is 
that infringement should occur only if protected plants are reproduced by grafting from patented stock. In both 
regards, plant patents seem to resemble "copyright" more than they do "patent" protection.[54] 
3. Acquiring patents 
All patents require PTO approval of an application;[55] i.e., a patent must issue before any rights are conferred.
[56] The procedure for all three is similar, but the remaining discussion contemplates only utility patents. 
Before an application is filed,[57] the subject matter should be considered. Although some aspects of an 
invention may encompass debatable subject matter,[58] a specialist may be able to obtain adequate coverage. 
For example, while one cannot obtain a utility patent on a naturally occurring substance,[59] a claim drawn on 
an essentially pure form of that substance (or a method of obtaining it) may be patentable if it satisfies other 
requirements. 
Also, before filing, a prior art search should be made.[61] An invention could be fully disclosed in a patent or 
elsewhere; if so, it is not novel and is unpatentable.[62] Alternatively, one or more elements of the invention 
may lack novelty; in that case, one must convince an examiner that the invention would have been "unobvious" 
to those skilled in the art at the time it was made.[63] While a novelty search is not required, omitting it to save 
money could easily mean that the cost of preparing and filing an application is wasted. It could also result in less 
protection than deserved.[64] 
Before an application is filed, inventors must be identified. Regardless of ultimate ownership, a U.S. application 
must be filed in the inventors' names, and they usually must participate in "prosecution".[65] 
An application consists of a description of the invention (the "specification") with or without drawings, a fee, 
and an oath or declaration that the applicant is the first and true inventor.[66] The specification must describe 
the invention in terms that enable those skilled in the art to practice it and conclude with one or more "claims." 
The first (what patent attorneys usually mean by "specification") frames the inventors' contributions, but claims 
identify what is believed to be protectable.[67] 
Upon receipt, the PTO usually gives applications a filing date and serial number.[68] Based upon the 
classification of the claimed subject matter,[69] they are assigned to a patent examiner. When applications come 
up for action, examiners may object on formal grounds or reject one or more claims as substantively 
unpatentable.[70] 
This ex parte process rarely takes less than eighteen months, and may take several years, while the PTO attempts 
to ensure that the application is complete and enables others to practice the invention.[72] Are the claims 
reasonably related to the inventor's contribution?[73] Do they define proper subject matter that is useful, novel, 
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and not obvious at the time of the invention?[74] 
As mentioned,[75] the novelty requirement is a serious trap for the uninitiated but is easily avoided. No one 
should disclose or try to commercialize inventions without having discussed the situation with a specialist! U.S. 
law contains a one-year grace period, but patentability of an invention offered for sale, used or described 
publicly is immediately lost in most of the world.[76] 
If attorneys cannot convince examiners that submitted claims are allowable, they may be abandoned or 
narrowed, an application may be abandoned or refiled,[77] or appeals may be taken. Appeals within the PTO,
[78] and ultimately (short of the U.S. Supreme Court)[79] review in the CAFC[80] can be expensive. However, 
anyone who considers dropping or narrowing claims to control costs must consider that claims can cover the 
equivalent of a square inch of Arctic tundra or a square m ile of Manhattan.[81] One must consider whether 
protected territory is adequate.[82] Also, applicants should know that patentees are estopped from arguing that 
activity falling outside narrowed claims, upon equitable principles, infringes.[83] 
After an application satisfies the PTO, it is prepared for issue upon the payment of a further fee.[84] Here, 
applicants run a small risk of being drawn into an interference. Only one patent may issue for an invention. In 
the U.S., interferences determine who is first.[85] Although uncommon, interference require a believable record 
of what was done -- and when. As soon as innovation begins, inventors should start a notebook. Trusted third 
parties should be asked to witness it periodically and to indicate, in writing, that they have read and understood 
it.[86] 
4. Patents as property 
Patents can be used to prevent others from, e.g., making[87] protected subject matter for their duration[88] and 
have the attributes of personal property.[89] 
No rights exist before issue,[90] but patent applications may be assigned.[91] Employed inventors usually pre-
assign inventions.[92] Partial rights may be assigned, and unrecorded assignments are void against later 
transferees without actual notice.[93] 
Patents can also be licensed. This is often little more than a promise not to sue, e.g., if royalties are paid. If the 
licensee and licensor (or assignee and assignor) are in the same market, careful attention must be given to 
antitrust restrictions on horizontal agreements. Restrictions on vertical agreements are not so acute, but they 
should also be avoided.[94] 
The statute also provides that joint owners, in the absence of contrary agreement, may each practice an invention 
without accounting.[95] This can create serious problems for independent inventors. Would-be transferees are 
rarely interested in non-exclusive rights -- particularly where substantial risk capital is needed to develop and 
market the invention.[96] Unless co-owners agree on terms of a transfer, neither may have anything valuable to 
convey. This can be avoided if the inventors assign their respective interests to a single entity before 
disagreements arise. 
5. Enforcement and defenses 
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If infringement is discovered and negotiations fail, mediation and arbitration are possible.[97] Otherwise an 
action must be brought in federal court.[98] Besides being able to seek relief from direct infringers, patentees 
may also challenge those who induce or otherwise contribute to infringement.[99] Remedies include injunction 
and recovery of up-to-three times damages.[100] At a minimum, a reasonable royalty is awarded, and, in 
exceptional cases, attorney fees too. 
Two basic defenses, noninfringement and invalidity,[101] may be asserted in any IP infringement suit. Patent 
claims are presumed valid[102] but can be invalidated with clear and convincing evidence -- in what amounts to 
collateral review of the grant. Invalidated claims cannot later be asserted.[103] 
Applications may cover narrow inventions.[104] These often issue if claims are sufficiently limited. Examiners 
have difficulty showing that several obvious features, taken together, are obvious. Although others must copy 
quite closely to infringe narrow claims, the Supreme Court has traditionally shown little sympathy for such 
patentees and tended to find their patents invalid.[105] Inventors with limited resources may not appreciate the 
effect of undiscovered prior art.[106] Infringers encounter more difficulty convincing a court that a claim is 
invalid if the PTO considered all the art. It is thus unwise to stint on searches or fail to bring everything remotely 
relevant to an examiner's attention. All claims are unenforceable if an infringer can show, e.g., that known 
relevant art was not disclosed to the PTO, even if it applies to only one claim.[107] 
Even well-heeled applicants must attend to prosecution costs. They cannot afford to do other than prosecute 
domestic and foreign applications with vigor commensurate to the projected market value of their inventions. If 
that value is underestimated, searches may miss prior art. Once an invention has been commercialized, 
infringers have an inherent advantage: They know exactly what it is worth, and this may justify a considerably 
expanded novelty search.[109] 
Because patentees have the burden of proving infringement, it may be easier for infringers to show that their 
acts fall outside the scope of the claims. Once more, poorly financed patentees are particularly vulnerable. If 
claims are narrower than proven market value warrants, imitators may be able to design around the claims.[110] 
Besides invalidity and non-infringement, infringers have several general defenses. Perhaps the most prominent 
of these is unclean hands -- likely if the patentee's licenses contain restrictions going beyond the reach of the 
patent law[111] or violating antitrust laws.[112]A similar defense is fraud or inequitable conduct in prosecution. 
The consequences of the last are far more serious.[113] Unclean hands does not bar relief after offensive 
conduct has ceased, but all claims in an improperly procured patent are likely to be invalid. 
Finally, defenses can be affected by the relationship between the parties or the special status of the infringer. For 
example, an injunction will not lie against the federal government,[114] and state governments may not be sued 
in federal court.[115] Where licenses or assignments are involved, transferees have the usual contract defenses 
and may not be estopped from showing patent invalidity.[116] 
6. Avoiding infringement 
Because independent creation is not a defense, and copying is unnecessary for patent infringement, there is 
always a possibility that relatively new technology will infringe patents. This can be minimized with a search.
[117] Still, because some pending applications remain unavailable for inspection,[118] subsequently issued 
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patents pose a risk that blocking patents will issue later. 
Thus, even technology broadly described in the literature, licensed, or covered by expired patents poses some 
risk.[119] Infringement can always be avoided by ceasing to use the technology when a patent issues. Yet, this 
may be painful if start-up costs have not been recouped or substantial inventory has been accumulated. Hence, 




1. Origins and rationale
As with patents, the Constitution is the legal foundation for copyright.[121] The first copyright law was passed 
in 1790, but not until 1891 were foreign authors protected.[122] After a major revision in 1909, the law served 
remarkably well and was not replaced until 1976 -- partly because of technological advances. Amendments, 
mostly procedural, followed.[123] 
Copyright is intended to promote the progress of "science."[124] Persons who invest time and private capital can 
recover investments if consumers favor their work. However, as with inventors, few authors support themselves 
by direct public sales. Copyright would probably accomplish little if authors could not convey rights to 
publishers. Obviously, publishers who copy works without paying, e.g., for authors' time can beat the prices of 
those who do, and copyright goes a long way toward preventing free riding. 
Yet, while commercial infringement is comparatively easy to detect and address, non-commercial activity often 
is not. For example, individuals can make copies of computer software fully equivalent to those on sale -- and 
for a tiny fraction of the cost. Such copying is almost impossible to detect. Hence, honest users surely pay more 
than would be necessary if all contributed. In extreme situations, contributing users have been unable to support 
product development. 
2. Subject matter: Patents versus copyrights 
Copyrightable subject matter is primarily set forth in § 102. For example, § 102(a) reads: 
Copyright protection subsists... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of 
authorship include... (l) literary works (2) musical works including any accompanying words (3) 
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works 
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) 
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. [Emphasis added.]
Obviously this goes well beyond works associated with "authors" or "writings."[125] However, copyright has 
very important limitations. A major one appears in § 102(b), representing a clear effort to distinguish patentable 
subject matter: 
http://www.piercelaw.edu/tfield/plfip.htm (12 of 48)7/19/2006 3:16:32 PM
Practical & Legal Fundamentals of Intellectual Property
In no case does copyright protection of an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of 
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Notwithstanding many changes in the law, very early cases are still important.One of the most important 
antecedents is an 1879 decision involving bookkeeping forms. Defendant's forms were similar to plaintiff's 
copyrighted forms but had a different arrangement of columns and used different headings. In finding 
noninfringement, the Supreme Court said:[126] 
To give the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no 
examination of its novelty has ever been officially made would be a surprise and a fraud upon the 
public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright. [Emphasis added.]
The emphasized language confirms what was said earlier about the meaning of "art" and "science" in the 
Constitution. It also suggests that patents are more exclusive than copyrights, but that is not pursued. 
Further insight is provided in an opinion by Justice Holmes reversing two lower court holdings that circus 
posters do not qualify for copyright. Dismissing an apparent objection that copyright for pictures depicting real 
scenes would interfere with others' legitimate interests, he noted, "Others are free to copy the original. They are 
not free to copy the copy."[127] Also, dismissing the apparent objection that commercial "art" (in the modern 
sense) falls within "the useful arts," he held that "A picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject 
of copyright that it is used for for an advertisement."[128] Finally, disposing of the idea that posters are 
artistically unworthy, he said "That these pictures had their worth... is sufficiently shown by the desire to 
reproduce them without regard for the plaintiff's rights."[129] 
Finally, consider an important 1954 case.[130] There, plaintiffs had registered copyright in statuettes of dancing 
figures, the vast bulk being sold as fully equipped lamps. Defendants, having copied and sold the lamps, argued 
that plaintiffs' statuettes were protectable only by design patent because, as suggested in Baker, they "required 
the critical examination given patents to protect the public against monopoly."[131] Pointing out that "Neither 
the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is patentable, it may not be copyrighted,"[132] the 
court upheld the copyright. In doing so, Justice Reed observed:[133] 
Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only 
to the expression of the idea -- not the idea itself. ... Absent copying there can be no infringement 
of copyright. Thus, [plaintiffs] may not exclude others from using statuettes of human figures in 
table lamps; they may only prevent use of copies of their statuettes as such or as incorporated into 
some other article. [Emphasis added.]
In their efforts to distinguish the two, these opinions are as important to an understanding of patents as of 
copyrights. They also demonstrate the need for patents to be understood at some level even if one desires to do 
only copyright work. The last case in particular also gives insight into two § 101 definitions that further 
critically limit copyright: 
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"include two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of 
fine, graphic, and applied art.... [T]he design of a useful article... shall be considered a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work only... to the extent [it] incorporates... features... capable of existing 
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independently of [its] utilitarian aspects.... 
A "useful article"... [does] not merely... portray the appearance... or... convey information. An 
article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a "useful article." [Emphasis added.]
Because copyright covers sculpture but not "useful" articles, one might assume that Congress regards sculpture 
as "useless," but the language merely reflects a poor choice of terms. Semantics aside, these definitions cause 
serious problems for creators of works having other than a solely aesthetic function. It also sometimes leads to 
unfair discrimination between, e.g., masks that do[134] and costumes that may not[135] qualify. Works that 
cannot qualify, rather than having automatic protection, are protectable, if at all, by design patents that are often 
prohibitively expensive and slow.[136] Until recently, this situation faced architects as creators of "useful" 
works. Now, under § 102(a)(8), architectural works qualify.[137] Congress has been urged to consider 
liberalized protection for other "useful" works, but this has been resisted by the insurance industry lest the costs 
of replacement automobile fenders, grilles -- or even shock absorbers be increased.[138] 
3. Copyrights as property 
Provisions governing ownership and transfer are more complex and generally more thorough than those for 
patents.[139] One complexity arises, particularly with regard to unique works, because people may not 
distinguish ownership of works and of copyright.[140] Another arises because the statute treats works created 
"for hire"[141] and works created and assigned differently. 
If a work is created by an employee, it is "for hire"; the employer owns everything. If a work is finished before it 
is sold, it is not "for hire"; the author retains the copyright unless separately conveyed. Commissioned works 
warrant special care. They may be regarded as joint works,[142] but few can be "for hire" -- and only if so 
agreed in writing.[143] 
If a work is for hire, the term is the shorter of 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation. For other 
works, unless published anonymously or under a pseudonym, copyright lasts until 70 years after the death of the 
last surviviving author, if more than one.[144] Moreover, authors (or successors) have a right to terminate 
transfers within a five year period beginning 35 years after the transfer.[145] If a work is for hire, no termination 
right exists.[146] 
Aside from these matters, copyright and patent licenses and assignments are similar; e.g., it is necessary to 
record transfers to give constructive notice to later transferees.[147] 
4. Deposit and notice 
Nothing other than "fixing" by or under the authority of an author is necessary.[148] Neither notice nor deposit 
are required for U.S. copyright protection. Deposit of two copies of the best edition of many works is required, 
however, and failure to deposit following a Copyright Office demand can result in penalties.[149] 
Notice warrants closer attention. Under the 1909 Act, failure to give proper notice when a work was published 
was fatal: State protection was lost, and federal protection was forfeited. While copyright notice is unnecessary,
[150] it is still a good idea. Some countries where an author might have rights under international treaties 
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require traditional notice, as well as, e.g., "All rights reserved."[151] Also, after being free to copy published 
works lacking notice, some people will need to learn that lack of notice no longer means lack of copyright.[152] 
5. Registration 
While registration is unnecessary for copyright protection, infringement actions cannot be brought by owners of 
works originating in the U.S. until registration is at least attempted.[153] However, it is inexpensive,[154] 
generally straightforward and confers important remedial advantages -- regardless of country of origin. Failure 
to register unpublished works forfeits statutory damages and attorney fees for infringement commenced before 
registration. For published works registered within three months of publication, those remedies are available 
even for infringements commenced earlier.[155]. 
Registration follows an "examination".[156] The Copyright Office sometimes rejects an application for 
improper subject matter,[157] but registration is largely ministerial. Assuming appropriate subject matter, only 
subjective novelty is usually required.[158] Thus, many valid copyrights apparently could cover very similar 
works (e.g. , photographs of the same tree, taken from the same angle), each in a different owner.[159] Even 
works derived from prior works (e.g., a film based on a novel) seem generally to qualify,[160] but these are of 
course subject to any rights in the originals. 
6. Enforcement and defenses 
Exclusive rights are set forth in § 106. They include the right to copy and sell (or rent) protected works and, for 
some, the right to perform or display publicly.[161] 
Persons who directly infringe copyrights or induce or otherwise contribute to infringement[162] must be sued in 
federal court.[163] Subject to possible limitation based on time of registration,[164] remedies include injunction, 
impounding (and destroying or otherwise disposing of) infringing copies, costs and attorneys' fees, damages and 
profits, and statutory minimum damages.[165] Those who infringe willfully and for gain suffer larger statutory 
damages and may incur criminal sanctions.[166] 
As with patents, invalidity and noninfringement are possible defenses -- along with generic defenses such as 
unclean hands[167] or fraud on the Copyright Office.[168] A certificate of registration issued before or within 
five years of publication constitutes only "prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts 
stated in the certificate,"[169] but invalidity is an uncommon defense.[170] 
Suits are more apt to turn on infringement. Noninfringement can be framed several ways, e.g., a work was 
independently created,[171] or use was proper. The latter can be further subdivided, e.g., use was (1) not 
forbidden by § 106,[172] (2) permitted by § 102(b)[173] or (3) permitted by "fair use" as defined in §§ 107-121. 
The last two are most likely to cause trouble for newcomers. 
Copyright registrations do not delimit coverage.[174] More than in the case of patents, judges often must decide 
whether what was copied was protected. They may conclude, e.g., that a directory identical to another does not 
infringe,[175] whereas a motion picture that is only substantially similar to an earlier play does.[176] 
Originally created by the courts, fair use defenses now occupy perhaps about half of the statute.[179] Section 
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107 and sequels permit use of another's work where the purpose and amount of use pose little likelihood of 
injury or are justified on policy grounds.[180] Were it not for fair use, critics and scholars could not quote, or a 
fortiori copy, another's work without permission or the risk of paying costs, attorneys' fees and statutory 
damages.[181] Teachers and librarians were particularly eager to have fair uses spelled out precisely, but this 
was not done.[182] Indeed it seems impossible to define "fair" with the kind of precision nonlawyers (or law 
students) may want. 
As with patents, copyright litigation can also be affected by the status of the infringer. Injunctions do not lie 
against the federal government, [183] and state governments may not be sued in federal court.[184] Prior 
dealings are troublesome -- partly because of the work for hire doctrine,[185] but problems go beyond that.[186] 
7. Avoiding infringement 
Because independent origin is a defense, liability can generally be avoided with records that show it. Yet, in one 
case, where two works were very much alike and the first was well known, the defense failed: It was concluded 
that copying, even if unconscious, had occurred .[187] 
When using another's work, caution is warranted -- particularly where there have been prior dealings.[188] Also, 
one can no longer regard a work without notice as being in the public domain.[189] Further, while "fair use" of 
another's work is permitted, a comparatively small amount of copying may infringe if it interferes with an 
owner's potential income or is more than incidentally connected with the user 's income.[190] 
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C. Trade Secrets 
1. Source, subject matter and federal preemption
Trade secret protection originated in common law, and the 1939 Restatement of Torts attempted to codify it.
[191] More recently there has been a trend toward statutory treatment. A uniform act has been drafted and 
adopted in whole or part in several states, and theft of trade secrets is now addressed in the federal criminal code.
[192] While the basics are the same, important details vary from state to state.[193] 
Also, federal law can have a major impact on trade secret law. For example, in the decade following the famous 
Sears and Compco preemption decisions,[194] IP attorneys wondered about the extent to which trade secret law 
still existed. However, a 1974 decision[195] held that, although subject matter often overlaps and legal 
objectives are similar, federal patent law does not preempt state trade secret protection. 
Copyright preemption may pose a problem, too -- particularly with unpublished works[196]since 17 U.S.C. § 
301 became effective.[197] Now, § 301(a), leaves no room for the states once a copyrightable work is "fixed in 
a tangible medium."[198] Moreover, § 301(b) provides:[199] 
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of 
any State with respect to -- (1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of 
copyright..., including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression, or... 
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(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive 
rights within the general scope of copyright....
Thus, it will be unclear whether state trade secret law applies to some controversies. However, if any part of the 
subject matter falls within copyright, plaintiffs will usually want to sue in copyright and append state counts. 
Copyright remedies are superior -- particularly if registration is prompt.[200] State trade secret and other 
protection, if not preempted, can have potentially unlimited duration,[201] but, given their likely duration, this 
will rarely be important. 
2. Acquiring, preserving and enforcing trade secret rights 
Both the Restatement and uniform act cover broad subject matter, but the latter explicitly includes information 
of potential as well as of current competitive value. It also provides that information is to be regarded as secret if 
"reasonable measures" are taken to preserve secrecy.[202] 
Still, both leave a large amount of ambiguity, e.g., where an employee changes jobs. How does one differentiate 
between information that is, on the one hand, part of an employee's stock in trade and, on the other, property of 
the employer?[203] Employers often try to avoid the issue by using covenants not to compete, but, if covenant 
conditions are unreasonable[204] or in excess of statutory maxima,[205] they will be unenforceable. Analogous 
problems can also arise when a business is sold or when two companies are dealing in other ways[206] -- 
particularly if the obligation to preserve or not to use secrets is implied. However, the Restatement and the 
uniform act do not appear to differ on such issues. 
Also, both the Restatement and uniform act forbid use of secrets obtained by criminal or tortious conduct.[207] 
However, neither seems to preclude using information obtained from incautious speakers in PTO elevators. Still, 
the latter includes "espionage" as wrongful. If this covers photographing plants from navigable airspace,[208] 
does it also include photographing from the roof of an adjacent building or a knothole in a fence? Whatever the 
answers might be, Supreme Court decisions forbid state laws that preclude use of information obtained by 
independent effort or reverse engineering.[209] 
3. Outside submissions 
Outside idea or invention submissions are a special case and seem best governed by contract law. Lacking a 
written contract, one should consider the custom in the trade and the professional status of the person providing 
information. If the outsider is an "amateur," and no established trade practice or prior dealings can be relied 
upon to establish an implied contract, recovery is unlikely: The outsider may be considered a "volunteer" or, if 
the information lacks objective novelty, be found to have submitted something of no value.[210] In contrast, if a 
submission comes from a professional and the custom is to accept and pay for the use of "unsolicited" 
information, a contract may be implied: The recipient may be obligated to pay fair value even if the information 
lacks objective novelty.[211] 
Attorneys who have the opportunity to represent an outside submitter should try to get a written agreement. 
Minimally, it should provide that the recipient, in consideration of the opportunity to evaluate the information, 
agrees neither to use it without compensation (later to be negotiated) nor to disclose it. However, attempts often 
fail:[212] Companies do not want to risk having to pay for what they already know or to be liable if information 
gets into the wrong hands. Also, companies may already have many of unused, internally-generated ideas and 
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not be interested in considering more![213] 
4. Trade secrets as property 
Secret information has at least some attributes of property. People who obtain it improperly can suffer criminal 
sanctions. Many states that do not otherwise provide statutory treatment for trade secrets protect them in 
criminal statutes.[214] Also, rights in secret information can be assigned, and the right to use it can be licensed. 
Unlike patents and copyrights that have a constitutionally mandated terminus,[215] trade secrets have a 
potentially perpetual duration.[216] Yet, as noted in Kewanee, their theoretical duration is undercut by 
limitations on what constitutes misappropriation.[217] 
5. Avoiding infringement 
Using information not derived from publications, independent research or copying products in the market 
warrants caution. For example, when hiring research and development personnel from competitors, it seems 
wise to examine written employment agreements for non-competition clauses. Also, one must never encourage 
others to disregard contracts: Inducing a breach of contract is usually a willful tort.[218] 
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[27] Citations in this subsection, unless otherwise indicated, are to 35 U.S.C. 
[28] See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. U.S. , 356 U.S. 1 (1958). See also, Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and 
Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & Econ. 265 (1977) wherein he likens patent claims to mining claims. 
[29] See supra note 6. 
[30] A thorough, if skeptical, review of their early history and rationale appears in Fritz Machlup, An Economic 
Review of the Patent System, Study No. 15 of the Senate Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). In all, 28 such studies were commissioned. Besides 
Machlup, others of possible current interest include Study 1, Vannevar Bush, Proposals for Improving the Patent 
System (1956); Study 2, George Frost, The Patent System and the Modern Economy (1957) and Study 26, 
Victor Abramson, The Patent System: Its Economic and Social Basis (1960). 
[31] In general, intellectual property rights do not permit owners to sell protected works. With regard to 
copyright for example, it should be clear that no one has a right to sell obscene works or works that infringe 
privacy rights, even if copyrighted. 
[32] Section 271(a). 
[33] Frost, supra note 30, at 76. 
Compare Shapiro, supra note 1. At 148, he notes: 
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In a sense all property is monopoly. ... [M]y monopoly in chair A does not prevent others from 
making... chairs B, C, or D. If, however, I owned the idea of a chair, and others could not make... 
anything embodying that idea, the whole society would be left standing until I chose to sell... on 
my terms.
Unfortunately, Shapiro does not explain, and I fail to see, how patentees have advantages not enjoyed by owners 
of chairs. At least beyond the first inventor, patents do not cover anything as broad as the "idea of a chair." 
Assuming rocks came first, then stools, people sit on those unless they are prepared to pay the patentee's price. 
When the patent expires (something that doesn't happen to title in chairs), anyone who cares to can make 
something that without the patentee's contribution is unlikely to exist -- particularly if significant private risk 
capital is needed to invent it. 
Consider a new cure for AIDS as an extreme example. What would induce its private development and testing 
without patents? If the concern is that a firm might offer it under only "unconscionable" terms, consider, e.g., 
that patentees cannot get injunctions against the federal government; see 28 U.S.C. § 1498. In this vein, see 
generally, Thomas G. Field, Jr., Pharmaceuticals and Intellectual Property: Meeting Needs Throughout the 
World, 31 Idea 3 (1990). 
Moreover, patent enforcement may sometimes be counterproductive; see, e.g., James Lardner, Fast Forward... 
68 (Mentor 1987). 
[34] Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (dissenting). 
[35] See e.g., Abe Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 810 (1971). For a comprehensive 
review of the situation through about 1966, see Shapiro, supra note 1. 
[36] Supra note 30. 
[37] See, e.g., Carole Kitti, Patent Validity Studies: A Survey, 20 Idea 55 (1979). See also, David Lowin, The 
Presumption Of Validity... (FPLC 1979); Thomas G. Field, Jr. and Juanita V. Field, Post Hoc Evaluations..., 20 
Idea 29 (1979). 
[38] See, e.g., Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). 
[39] See generally, Industrial Innovation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, and Select Comm. on Small Business, and House Comms. on Science and Technology, and 
Small Business, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Parts 1 and 2 (1979). The opening statements in Part 1 are of particular 
interest. 
As part of a lively exchange, Frank Press stated: "For twenty-five years the question of innovation and 
Americans' ability to innovate has been... around; it's been studied to death;" id., at 40. Unfortunately, this 
suggests more than is true. Much data has been collected, but its meaning is difficult if not impossible to discern. 
See, e.g., Thomas G. Field, Jr., Comment, Perceptions of Chief Patent Counsel at Large Corporations of the 
Effects of Patent Term... on Firm R&D, 32 Idea 277 (1992). 
[40] See 28 U.S.C. § 1295. 
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[41] The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia. Their views of the law sometimes differed, and patentees no doubt took advantage of that. 
[42] However, CCPA judges never saw infringement suits and the D.C. Circuit rarely, if ever, saw them. This 
could well have biased both courts in favor of patentees. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 178 and 181-2. 
[43] Id. Not until 1966 did the Supreme Court grant certiorari from the CCPA at the behest of the PTO; see 
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 523. However, it did so much earlier from the D.C. Circuit; see Kingsland v. 
Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318; rehear. den. 338 U.S. 939 (1930). 
[44] See supra notes 41 & 42. 
[45] At least in the short term, whether this is true seems irrelevant. People have little choice except to act on 
what they believe is true. Indeed, it is possible that perceptions could, at any point in time, be totally out of 
phase with more objective assessments of the "value" of patents or other intellectual property -- or be skewed by 
incomplete data; see, e.g., Erica Bodwell, Published and Unpublished Federal Circuit Decisions..., 30 Idea 233 
(1990). See also, Fred E. McKelvey, Appeals to The Federal Circuit from PTO, 1120 O.G. 22 (PTO1990) 
(offering full data for Oct. 1985 through Sept. 1990). 
[46] Section 101. 
[47] See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) or Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
[48] Section 171. 
[49] See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (CCPA 1982). 
[50] See, e.g., Sears, 376 U.S. 225, and Compco, 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
[51] Section 173. 
[52] See generally, §§ 161-64. Plants may also be protected by the Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 
2321-2583 (1988); this protection governs sexual propagation and falls within the jurisdiction of the Department 
of Agriculture. 
[53] See, e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306. 
[54] See David Bernstein, Is a Plant Patent a Form of Copyright? 27 Idea 31(1986). 
[55] Section 111. 
[56] Section 154(a)(2). 
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[57] As discussed supra at note 14, only attorneys who have passed a special examination (or equivalent) are 
permitted to prosecute patent applications before the PTO. See also, e.g., Arnesen, 333 F.Supp. 116. 
[58] See, e.g., cases cited supra note 47. 
[59] See, e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306. Actually, early "subject matter" cases seem to be far more 
concerned with, e.g., correspondence between the scope of disclosure and claims than with subject matter. See 
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854); see also, the discussion of O'Reilly in Appln. of Zoltan Tarczy-Hornoch, 
397 F.2d 856 (CCPA 1968). 
[61] Patent attorneys distinguish several kinds of searches. A "prior art" or patentability search is used to 
determine whether an invention is sufficiently novel to warrant filing an application. At a minimum, such a 
search should include domestic patents and leading indices, e.g., Chem Abstracts. A "validity" search is 
similar, but it is conducted after a patent issues and is likely to be more intensive and to cover a wider scope of 
prior art, e.g., foreign patents and technical publications. An "infringement" search is conducted to determine 
whether a new product falls within the claims of current patents. The last need only go back for length of the 
patent term (see infra note 88) but may require considerable effort if a new product is particularly complex. 
Many firms in the Washington, D.C. area provide search services. 
[62] Section 102, particularly subsection (a). 
[63] Section 103. 
[64] For example, failure to discuss advantages over the prior art may preclude later efforts to distinguish that 
art both within and without the PTO. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 23 (1966). 
[65] Sections 116-18. Even if an invention has been previously assigned as a condition of employment, the 
application must be filed in the inventor's name, not the assignee's; see § 118. With regard to joint inventors, see 
discussion infra note 92. 
[66] Sections 111-15, 41. 
[67] Section 112 ¶ 1; subsequent paragraphs indicate that multiple claims are permissible. 
[68] See, e.g., § 111. 
[69] Organized by a complex, constantly changing scheme published in the Manual of Classification. 
[70] Sections 131-33. 
[72] Section 112. 
[73] Id.; see also, supra note 59. 
[74] Sections 101-3. Of these, for qualifying subject matter, § 103 is usually most difficult; see, e.g., Carole 
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Kitti, Patent Validity Studies: A Survey, 20 Idea 55 (1979). See also, Thomas G. Field, Jr., Law and Fact in 
Patent Litigation: Form vs. Function, 27 Idea 153 (1987). 
[75] Part II.B. 
[76] Section 102(b). Foreig n law is generally beyond the scope of this discussion; see generally, World 
Intellectual Property Organization, Background Reading Material on Intellectual Property 83 (1988). 
[77] See § 120. 
[78] Section 134. 
[79] See, e.g., supra note 43. 
[80] Sections 141-46. In situations not so governed, review may be had under the Administrative Procedure Act; 
5 U.S.C. § 703 (1977), and CAFC jurisdiction is only arguably conferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1295. Although 
review was not under 5 U.S.C., see, e.g., Wyden v. Comm'r Patents & Trademarks, 807 F.2d 934, 937 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (Chief Judge Markey dissenting). 
[81] Either in terms of the amount of technology covered or their market value. The last seems to be all that 
counts; see Seeking Cost-Effective Patents, supra note 26. 
[82] Id. 
[83] See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002). 
[84] See generally, §§ 151-53; § 41(2) sets the issue fee. Also note that subsequent fees are necessary to 
maintain the patent in force; see § 41(b). 
[85] Section 135. 
[86] The PTO has a "Document Disclosure Program." However, as discussed in a brochure explaining it 
(available from Commissioner of Patents, Washington, DC 20331), this is not best to establish priority and is 
useless to avoid time bars discussed supra, e.g., at notes 23 and 62. However, provisional utility applications 
filed under § 111(b) may be more useful and cost-effective. 
[87] For design and utility patents, § 154; for plant patents, § 163. 
[88] Since 1994, the term of plant and utility patents has been twenty years from the date of first filing, Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, Pub.L. 103-465, § 532(a)(1). See §§ 154(a)(2) and 161 (§ 163 does not provide 
otherwise). Design patents have a fourteen year term, § 173. See also, § 154(b) (extensions of up to five years to 
compensate for delays caused by interferences and appeals) and, e.g., § 156 (limited extension for delay in pre-
market approval of drugs and related products. 
[89] Section 261. 
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[90] See, e.g., supra note 56. See also, Morehouse Mfg. v. Strickland, 407 F.2d 881 (CCPA 1969), quoted infra 
at note 301. 
[91] See also, §§ 116-118 
[92] For further discussion of employed inventors, see, e.g., Peter D. Rosenberg, 2 Patent Law Fundamentals 
§ 11.04 (1989). 
[93] Section 261. 
[94] See generally, e.g., Jerrold G. Van Cise, William T. Lifland & Laurence T. Sorkin, Understanding The 
Antitrust Laws 162 (9th ed. 1986). 
[95] Section 262. See also § 116. 
[96] Such concerns eventually led to specific provisions permitting the government to grant exclusive rights in 
government inventions; see §§ 200-212 and, e.g., Lawrence Rudolph, Overview of Federal Technology 
Transfer, 5 Risk 133 (1994). See also, Ronald E. Barks, Accessing and Licensing Federal Technology, 
Licensing Law and Business Report, May-June 1992, at 76: "[F]or every $1 of research, a company spends $10 
to develop the product and another $100 to take it to market." 
[97] Section 294. See also, e.g., Thomas G. Field, Jr., Patent Arbitration..., 24 Idea 235 (1984); Thomas G. 
Field, Jr. & Michael Rose, Prospects for ADR in Patent Disputes: An Empirical Assessment of Attorneys 
Attitudes, 32 Idea 309 (1992); and Norman L. Balmer, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Patent Controversies, 
6 Risk 145 (1995). Further, see § 135(d) (arbitration may be used to resolve interferences). 
[98] See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a), 1400, and 1498. 
[99] Section 271(b) and (c). Regarding the latter, see Dawson, 448 U.S. 176. See also, §§ 271(f) and (g). 
[100] See generally, §§ 281-88. Also, § 289 provides minimum statutory damages for design patent 
infringement. 
[101] These are the first two enumerated patent defenses; see generally, § 282. 
[102] Id., first sentence. 
[103] See §§ 288 and 290. See also, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. Univ. Ill. Fndn., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
[104] See, e.g., U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Patents and the Commercialization of New 
Technology 170-4 (Draft June 21, 1982) and Brief Survey... Patent, Trademark, Copyright, supra note 3, at 89. 
[105] See, e.g., Graham, 383 U.S. 1, or Sakraida v. Ag Pro, 425 U.S. 273 (1976). See also, Shapiro, supra note 
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1. While the CAFC may have more sympathy for such inventors than some circuits have heretofore shown (see, 
e.g., supra notes 41-43), it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will go along. 
[106] There is even a possibility of invalidity based on another's earlier secret use of the invention. See, e.g., 
Dunlop Holding Ltd. v. Ram Golf Corp., 524 F.2d 33 (7th cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976). 
[107] See, e.g., Handgards v. Ethicon, 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984). 
[109] Therefore, they may be motivated to investigate, e.g., foreign publications and other prior art that would 
invalidate the patent under § 102(a). 
[110] See , e.g., Field (1985) supra note 3, at 90-92 
[111] See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
[112] See David Lowin, Whether Patented or Unpatented..., 23 Idea 77 (1982). 
[113] See, e.g., Handgards, 743 F.2d 1282; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 -- a provision with a long, checkered 
career. 
[114] See 28 U.S.C. § 1498. 
[115] See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 
(1999), and Regents of University of California v. Genentech, Inc., 527 U.S. 1031 (1999) (patent suit vacated 
and remanded in light thereof). 
[116] See, e.g., Lear, 506 U.S. 653. 
[117] Supra note 61. 
[118] See § 122. 
[119] See, e.g., § 101 providing for improvement patents. These are likely to be narrower than so-called 
"pioneer" patents. If the earlier patents are still in effect, improvement patents cannot be practiced without 
infringing -- further illustrating the proposition that intellectual property only excludes others. 
Many countries avoid such problems, e.g., by granting patents to the first to file and publishing pending 
applications; see generally World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 76. The U.S. now publishes 
pending applications; see § 122.. 
[120] Citations in this subsection, unless otherwise indicated, are to 17 U.S.C. 
[121] Supra note 6. 
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[122] See, e.g., William F. Patry, Latman's The Copyright Law 2-15 (6th ed. 1979) for a brief discussion of 
the early history of copyright law. 
For an account of the early situation with foreign authors, see Lardner, supra note 33, at 120. This entertaining 
book describes the divergent economic interests of the motion picture and video recorder industries, and to a 
lesser extent Japan and the U.S., that led to Sony Corp. Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984). 
[123] A major thrust of the 1976 act was to move the U.S. toward joining the Berne international copyright 
convention. It does not permit formal requisites to protection. After joining, Congress passed "An act to... 
implement the Berne Convention...," P.L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). One of the more significant 
substantive changes added architectural works to § 102(a). See also § 104(c) regarding possible implied 
changes. 
[124] Supra note 6. 
[125] Id. 
[126] Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102. 
Unfortunately such things were long regarded as inappropriate for a patents; see, e.g., Gordon R. Blakney, Jr., 
Systems of Business Patents, 30 Idea 355 (1990). But see State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
Notwithstanding Baker, tests of scholastic aptitude and other psychological characteristics seem to enjoy 
copyright protection; see, e.g., Educational Testing Services v. Katz, 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986) and Applied 
Innovations, Inc. v. Regents of the U. of Minn., 876 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1989). Given that such tests lose their 
utility if the expression is changed, such protection would seem to run afoul of § 102(b). 
[127] Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing, 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903), but see, e.g., Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 
930 (2d Cir. 1914) or Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Scoreboard Posters, 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979) -- in 
neither of the latter cases was plaintiff's work copied. 
[128] Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251. 
[129] Id., at 252. 
[130] Mazer, 347 U.S. 201(1954); see also supra at note 8. 
[131] Mazer, 347 U.S. at 215. 
[132] Id., at 217. 
[133] Id., at 217-18. 
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[134] See, e.g., Masquerade Novelty v. Unique Industries, Inc., 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990) (masks shaped to 
resemble animal noses have no function other than that associated with their appearance). Contrast costumes 
that also serve, e.g., to preserve the modesty of the wearer as in Whimsicality, infra. 
[135] See, e.g., Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., Inc., 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989) (where arguably 
uncopyrightable costumes were represented to be copyrightable soft sculpture, the court refused to reach the 
issue of copyrightability because the registration was obtained fraudulently). 
[136] Also, one might consider that copyrights may last for a lifetime and beyond, whereas design patents last 
only fourteen years. However, this is likely to be insignificant where the problem is that design patents issue too 
slowly. Thus, makers of clothing, and at one time fabric designs, have been in a difficult situation and unable to 
resort to self help; see Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); see also, 
Cheney Bros. v Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (1929). 
[137] Subject to the right, e.g., to photograph a building "ordinarily visible from a public place;" see § 120(a). 
[138] At least until 1986, in the United Kingdom, such works were protected through the doctrine of "indirect 
copying," see British Leyland Motor Corp. Ltd. v. Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd., H.L.E. [1986] 2 W.L.R. 400 
(Appeal taken from Court of Appeal). 
[139] However, § 201(a) provides that authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright without, as in the case 
of the patent statute, specifying their obligation to one another. Compare supra at note 95. 
[140] Section 202. See also, e.g., Community for Creative Non-violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
[141] Section 101 "work made for hire." 
[142] See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-violence, 490 U.S. 730. See also, Olan Mills, Inc. v. Eckerd, 1989 
WL 90605 (N.D.Tex.) (pharmacy infringed by reproducing portraits at the behest of the subjects, 
notwithstanding suggestion that the latter could authorize reproduction, e.g., as joint authors). 
[143] Section 101 "work made for hire" (2). 
[144] Section 302. A helpful online page maps out most of the options. 
[145] Section 203(a)(3). 
[146] Section 203(a) ("In the case of any work other than a work made for hire..."). 
[147] Sections 204 and 205. 
[148] Section 301(a). 
[149] Section 407(d). 
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[150] Sections 401 and 405. 
[151] See, e.g., Patry, supra note 122, at 307 -- discussing inter-American protection under the 1911 Buenos 
Aires Convention. 
[152] See also, § 405(b). 
[153] Section 411. See also, 7; 101 "country of origin." But see, Pacific and Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 
1490, 1499, fn. 17 (11th Cir. 1984) (enjoining infringing works not yet created, much less registered). 
[154] The fee is $30 per registration; see § 708(a)(1). For what constitutes a single work, see 37 C.F.R. § 202.3
(b); see also, § 202.20 (1989). 
[155] Section 412. Regarding promptness of registration, see also, § 410(c). 
[156] Section 410(a), but, under § 410(d), the certificate dates back to that of the completed application. 
[157] See, e.g., Esquire v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
[158] See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). 
[159] Id.; see also, supra note 127. 
[160] See, e.g., Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d 99. But see, e.g., § 115(b), providing a limitation (difficult to fathom) on 
the rights of those who prepare derivatives of nondramatic musical works. 
[161] See § 101 "perform or display..."; see also, e.g., § 109(c). 
[162] See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). One of the most remarkable things about the case is that the Court 
cited and discussed 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (the patent statute) in deciding whether contributory infringement had 
occurred. This was found warranted insofar as the doctrine was originally created by the courts, and no 
provisions appear in the copyright statute. 
[163] See 28 U.S.C § 1338. 
[164] Supra note 155. 
[165] See generally, §§ 501-10. 
[166] Section 506. 
[167] However, at least two Circuits have refused that defense as an attack on copyright validity. See, e.g., 
Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1973) and Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater 
604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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Regarding possible antitrust problems, see, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 
441 U.S. 1 (1979). See also, § 109(b)(2). 
[168] But see, Whimsicality, 891 F.2d 452, discussed supra note 134. 
[169] Section 410(c). 
[170] But see, Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (lst Cir. 1967). 
[171] If a work is very similar to an earlier distributed work, access as well as copying may be presumed. See, e.
g., ABKCO Music v. Harrisongs Music, 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). But see, Benson v. Coca-Cola Co., 795 
F.2d 973 (11th Cir. 1986). 
[172] See, e.g., Muller v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 43 F.Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (finding a bridge not to 
infringe a drawing of a bridge). In the U.S., three dimensional works infringe only if they are also copyrightable 
(not "useful"). Compare, e.g., Fleischer Studios v. Freundlich, 73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934) and see supra 
note 138. 
[173] See, e.g., Baker, 101 U.S. 99, discussed supra note 126. 
[174] See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1962); at 627, Judge Clark 
(dissenting) called attention to a third doll, apparently in the public domain, that more resembled an allegedly 
infringing doll than did the doll said to be infringed. Patent examination attempts to preclude such a result, e.g., 
by forbidding claims that cover subject matter that can be freely used by anyone. 
[175] Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
[176] Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936). 
[179] Sections 107-121. Some focus on works, e.g., § 120 (architecture), some on users, e.g., § 108 (libraries 
and archives) and some on activities, e.g., § 106 (transfers of particular copies) or § 121 (translations for the 
blind). 
[180] And perhaps when the defendant's conduct is otherwise reasonable; see, e.g., Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 
1171 (9th Cir. 1983) (failure to attribute cited as a reason to deny the fair use defense). 
[181] Supra notes 127-129 and discussion. 
[182] It is not easy to find, much less interpret, applicable provisions. The Copyright Office has made the task 
somewhat easier. See Copyright Office Circular 21: Reproduction of Copyrighted Works by Educators and 
Librarians (1991); this document contains statutory provisions and legislative history as well as "guidelines" that 
were negotiated during pendency of the Act. The latter cover, e.g., teachers' use of books and periodicals. 
[183] See 28 U.S.C. 1498. 
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[184] See supra note 115. 
[185] See supra at notes 139-42. 
[186] See supra at note 127. See also, Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 797 F.2d 1222 
(3d Cir. 1986), but see Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984). 
[187] ABKCO Music, 722 F.2d 983. 
[188] See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
[189] See, e.g., supra at notes 148-50. 
[190] See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
[191] See §§ 757-59. See also, Restatement Third, Unfair Competition §§ 30-45 (1995). 
[192] See William E. Hilton, What Sort of Improper Conduct Constitutes Misappropriation of a Trade Secret, 
30 Idea 287, at 297 [Appendix A] (1990) (regarding state statutes). The federal statute is codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1831-39. 
[193] See, e.g., Steve Borgman, The Adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act: How Uniform is Uniform? 27 
Idea 73 (1986). 
[194] 376 U.S. 225 and 234, respectively. 
[195] Kewanee, 416 U.S. 470. 
[196] To conflict, subject matter must be susceptible of secret commercial use. This is unlikely for most 
copyright subject matter. With regard to software, where dual protection may be possible, the Copyright Office 
has muddied the water; see, e.g., Thomas F. Marsteller, Jr. & Robert L. Tucker, Copyrighting Trade Secrets..., 
25 Idea 211, 218-22 (1984) -- especially the discussion of 37 C.F.R. § 202.20, at 219-20. 
[197] Compare Field (1975), supra note 3, at 531 and 537 (prior to the 1976 Act). 
[198] Section 301(a); this means that state law is likely to be important only for works that are publicly 
performed (probably excluding trade secrets) but not recorded. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). Insofar as that subject matter arguably falls within copyright, it seems 
that, had Zacchini been inclined to ratify the unauthorized fixing of his performance, the case could have been 
brought under federal law. See, e.g., Pacific and Southern Co., 744 F.2d 1490. 
[199] This provision was heavily influenced by International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 
(1918). See, e.g., 122 Cong. Rec. § 2042-43 (Feb. 19 1976) [letter from the Department of Justice] and H. 10910 
(Sept. 22, 1976) [statement. of Rep. Seiberling]. Citing Sears, 376 U.S. 225 and Compco, 376 U.S. 234, the 
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Department urged that what is now 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) be worded to avoid reinstating the "misappropriation" 
doctrine as defined by International News Service. The section reads as suggested. 
[200] See supra at note 155. 
[201] See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) (the Constitutional "limited times" language does 
not affect state power). See also, e.g., Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339 (D. N.J. 1981) 
(describing a type of work that is not secret and, as long as it is neither fixed nor regarded as within 
copyrightable subject matter, could have virtually perpetual protection. 
[202] In this and other regards the uniform act apparently tries to codify the holdings in E.I. duPont de Nemours 
& Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). 
[203] An especially interesting factual and procedural situation appears in American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 
742 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1984); see, e.g., at 329. 
[204] See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assoc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307 (1976). 
[205] See, e.g., NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247, 251, fn. 5 (5th Cir. 1985). 
[206] E.g., Kewanee, 416 U.S. 470. 
[207] Trade secret law often emphasizes how information is obtained rather than the information itself; see, e.g., 
Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30 (1889). See also Kewanee, 416 U.S. 470. But see Smith v. Dravo Corp. 203 
F.2d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 1953) (finding "Pennsylvania will not deny recovery merely because the design could 
have been obtained through inspection") with Van Products Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 
248 (1965) (holding to the contrary). 
[208] See duPont, 431 F.2d 1012. 
[209] Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989). But see 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32 (federal sui 
generis protection for boat hulls). 
[210] See, e.g., Downey v. General Foods, 31 N.Y.2d 56 (1972). Compare Liggett & Myer Tobacco Co. v. 
Meyer, 194 N.E. 206 (1936), where the idea was arguably more novel. 
[211] See, e.g., Minnear v. Tors, 266 Cal.App.2d 495, (1968) (regarding an idea for a television series -- 
something excluded from copyright by § 102(b)). But compare, Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 
988 (2d Cir. 1988) (refusing to compensate, for lack of novelty, a professional who allegedly suggested the idea 
for The Cosby Show). 
[212] Indeed, companies are more likely to advance their own agreement disavowing any liability; see, e.g., 
Burten v. Milton Bradley, 763 F.2d 461 (lst Cir. 1985) (company ultimately liable, partly based on evidence of 
subsequent modification). 
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[213] See generally, Del I. Hawkins & Gerald G. Udel l, Corporate Caution and Unsolicited New Product 
Ideas, 58 J.P.O. Soc'y 375 (1976). See also, supra note 3. 
[214] See generally, Hilton, supra note 192. 
[215] Supra note 6. 
[216] Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 560. 
[217] 416 U.S. at 489-91. 
[218] See, e.g., Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies..., 49 U. Chi. 




IV. Preserving Competition on the Merits
A. Preventing Misrepresentations Generally 
1. Suits forbidden at common law
As mentioned, competition can be thwarted when firms misrepresent the source, quality or price of their goods 
or services. At common law, private parties could take legal action against such misrepresentation only if they 
were uniquely affected.[219] Unlike competitors, consumers can usually show specific injury, and aggregate 
injury can be very large, but damage suffered by individual consumers is often inadequate to justify suit.[220] 
Moreover, if firms continue to misrepresent, aggregate injury may snowball as others compete, not by, e.g., 
dropping prices, but by making even more egregious misrepresentations. Such problems could first be addressed 
other than by consumers when the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was created to enjoin "unfair methods of 
competition."[221] However, only after an amendment in 1938, could the FTC clearly enjoin "unfair and 
deceptive acts and practices" that did not injure competition.[222] Not until much later did states begin to deal 
with such problems.[223] 
Honest firms may find the cost of suit against a competitor's misrepresentations to be justified, but not until the 
Lanham Act was passed in 1947, did they have a cause of action.[224] Since then, § 43(a)[225] has allowed 
them to seek injunctions[226] even though it may be impossible to show special damages,[227] i.e., that 
particular sales were lost because of a competitor's misrepresentations. Modern cases sometimes consider 
whether defendant's activities sufficiently affect the plaintiff in particular, e.g., to warrant standing, but it is 
difficult to see why a commercial enterprise would sue without strong conviction of potential harm -- 
particularly if competitors could derive as much or more benefit.[228] Indeed, in the latter situation, firms might 
ask the FTC or another public entity to take action. 
2. Suits permitted at common law 
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a. Unfair competition, dilution and right of publicity 
Trademarks are discussed in detail below, but "unfair competition"[229] suits furnish a classic illustration of the 
difference between this and the previous discussion. If a seller deliberately or carelessly represents its goods as 
coming from or being sponsored by another, injury is generally clear. Thus, owners of marks have long been 
able to bring actions if another uses similar marks on competing goods or services.[230] To prevail, they usually 
must show that words or other devices used to indicate source are inherently distinctive or have acquired 
"secondary"[231] meaning.[232] They usually must also show that consumer are or are likely to be confused. 
Yet, where a defendant intentionally represents its or another's goods or services as those of the plaintiff, both 
requirements for relief may be presumed.[233] 
Famous marks present a particularly interesting situation insofar as owners may prevent their use on very 
dissimilar goods or services -- where "unfair competition" does not literally exist.[234] Yet, consumers may be 
misled in the short term, and both consumers and owners of famous marks may suffer from erosion of a mark's 
uniqueness.[235] Recently, state and federal "dilution" statutes have sought to expand this law by protecting less 
well-known marks.[236] Still, it is unclear how unique a mark must be to qualify for protection. It is less clear if 
marks differ.[237] 
Famous persons can also prevent firms from suggesting associations that do not exist. A variety of theories may 
be used,[238] and "right of publicity" is one of them.[239] This right is sometimes described as what public 
persons get in return for their loss of privacy, but its boundaries are far from clear. While privacy rights do not 
survive their owner's death, a right of publicity may -- particularly if the person had been engaged in commercial 
sponsorship while living.[240] However, some publicity cases go well beyond preventing misrepresentation and 
raise preemption issues where the work to be protected has been fixed, e.g., by videorecording, by or under the 
authority of its owner.[241] 
b. Trade libel, product disparagement and free speech
Injurious statements about a firm (trade libel) or its products (disparagement), may cause demonstrable harm 
and might be presumed. Yet, injunctions may be unavailable and damages difficult to recover. The law is a mix 
of sometimes arcane common law and, increasingly, unsettled constitutional law and is not easy to understand. 
One should first distinguish commercial and non-commercial speech. The latter is not subject to prior restraint, i.
e., injunction.[242] Also, because the threat of tort liability can deter speech, it is often difficult to recover 
damages -- particularly if the subject is of public concern.[243] Offers to sell were long regarded as unprotected, 
but public interference with truthful advertising has since been limited. Cases apt to be most durable focus on 
the need for readily available consumer information.[244] Also, the FTC has moved against private restraints on 
competitive advertising.[245] 
Because of such developments, early cases enjoining, e.g., consumer libel and disparagement are of doubtful 
current vitality[246] -- as are cases enjoining other disparaging activity.[247] Even cases awarding damages 
merit careful scrutiny.[248] 
Speech involving matters of public concern is protected two ways. First, plaintiff may have to show, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that defendant's offensive statements are false. Second, plaintiff may have to show, 
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again by clear and convincing evidence, that demonstrably false injurious statements were known by defendant 
to be false or that defendant acted maliciously or in reckless disregard of the truth. 
For a public person to get relief, a clear showing of malice or reckless disregard of the truth must be made, and, 
although there is remarkably little law on point, it seems difficult to imagine why a commercial firm or its goods 
would not also bear that burden.[249] Even when the speaker is a competitor, the burden ought not be lowered, e.
g., by presuming malice.[250] 
In 1988, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act was amended to permit such suits as a matter of federal law if the speaker is 
engaged in commercial advertising or promotion.[251] It will be interesting to see how federal courts develop 
the law, e.g., whether they do so based on the Constitutional or tort doctrine,[252] and the extent to which they 
find that firms and their products are subject to honest, if mistaken, criticism by competitors who have an 
especially strong incentive to inform consumers. 
3. General observations on § 43(a) 
The Lanham Act may now be used to address a range of unfair trade practices regardless of whether they could 
be addressed at common law. It bears emphasis that § 43(a) permits federal suit for source misrepresentation, 
regardless of diversity and the amount in controversy -- or federal trademark registration.[253] Moreover, 
remedies equal those afforded federally registered marks.[254] Thus, two alleged benefits of federal registration
[255] (federal jurisdiction and usually superior remedies) are available to owners of any mark. Still, if a 
defendant's behavior is particularly egregious, one should at least consider whether punitive damages or other 
state relief might be better in particular situations.[256] 
In all cases involving alleged misrepresentations, consumers' impressions are critical. Facially false statements 
(or facially deceptive marks) may not deceive[257] -- and facially truthful statements may create false 




1. Development of the federal law
Source indicators appear to have been used for thousands of years.[260] However, general legal protection 
against another's use of misleading source indicators is more recent.[261] The first federal trademark statute was 
passed in 1870, but it was struck down in 1879[262] for exercising power conferred by neither the patent and 
copyright nor commerce clauses.[263] Although another trademark statute was enacted in 1881, and still others 
in 1905 and 1920, these were quite limited,[264]. Still, many cases prior to the famous 1938 Erie decision were 
decided under federal common law.[265] For example, in Kellogg, decided shortly thereafter, the Court 
observed:[266] "But no claim has been made that the local law is any different from the general law on the 
subject, and both parties have relied almost entirely on federal precedents." Efforts to reform the federal law had 
begun earlier, but it is ironic that the first hearings on a new law were held the same year.[267] Because 
attention was diverted by the war, what ultimately became the Lanham Act was not passed until 1946.[268] 
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With few amendments, that is the law today. 
In Lanham Act § 45, "commerce" is defined as "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by 
Congress."[269] Given the modern view of the commerce clause, federal law could well have exhausted the 
field. However, this has not happened, and state law can be significant.[270] 
2. Trademark rationale revisited 
The rationale for trademark law is starkly different from that for protecting work products. One firm may forbid 
another from imitating its trade dress, but injunctions must be narrowly crafted to permit competitors to 
duplicate otherwise unprotected products.[271] Analogous limits apply to names. It would do consumers little 
good if a firm could copy a product but not identify it in a way that consumers would recognize.[272] 
Notwithstanding these limitations, trademarks are sometimes seen as anticompetitive. Brand names for 
pharmaceuticals in particular have been controversial, but it would be difficult to eliminate them.[273] Critics 
tend to ignore the need of consumers to search out low cost, reliable products as well as the role of source 
identifiers in furthering that end. Antitrust law rests in part on the idea that competition encourages firms to 
produce the highest quality products or services at the lowest possible price. Before this can occur, assuming 
that other firms have a right to copy a particular product or service, consumers need accurate information about 
the source and other characteristics of products.[274] 
Particularly for products without close consumer safety regulation, firms' investments in goodwill may also 
provide the most reliable assurance of safe product design and quality.[275] It is difficult to imagine how a 
competitive market could function without source indicators -- even so-called "generics" may have them! 
3. Obtaining rights: strength of marks 
As with trade secrets and copyrights, trademark rights usually arise automatically once certain conditions have 
been met. First, a word or other symbol must be used as a source indicator.[276] This is commonly done by 
using ServicemarkSM or TrademarkTM; the symbol for a Federally Registered Mark® should not be used 
prior to federal registration. Second, it must be recognized as such.[277] Once those conditions exist, the first 
user[278] can usually prevent later users -- despite their good faith -- from using the same or a similar mark in 
such a way as to cause confusion. 
The second requirement is most easily met if distinctive marks are chosen. If not, enforcement can be difficult to 
impossible.[279] For example,[280] marks that merely identify goods or services, e.g., "Two-hour Dry 
Cleaning," or are associated with other firms should be avoided. Again, one cannot get exclusive rights to 
common names for products or to functional aspects of trade dress.[281] Also, one cannot acquire rights in 
marks similar to those already in use.[282] 
Words that describe a product or service can acquire source significance. Yet, they cannot be readily registered,
[283] and relief will be limited.[284] If they merely identify a seller by surname, it will be difficult, at best, to 
limit others with the same name.[285] If they indicate geographical origin, it will be difficult to stop others in 
the same location. Finally, one cannot prevent firms from using words needed to describe products. Thus, even 
if users of such terms eventually convince consumers that they indicate a particular company, relief will be 
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limited. 
Marks that suggest, without describing, some favorable characteristic of a product are better. Thus, "Whopper" 
or "Ultra-bright" can be strong marks, given that competitor will be hard pressed to give an acceptable reason 
for using them in naming or describing their products. 
Words that misdescribe a product can be either very good or very poor. A term that leads consumers to expect 
something other than what they get is unlikely to be protected and, worse, is useless for building goodwill. In 
contrast, "Rabbit" brand automobiles or "Apple" brand computers are unlikely to confuse anyone and may even 
suggest a favorable product characteristic. Nevertheless, others can, of course, use such words for their ordinary 
meaning.[286] 
The strongest marks are coined words such as "Kodak" or wholly arbitrary product or package designs.[287] 
Yet, truly new products or services for which no common names exist are a special case. In such an instance, 
one cannot stop with a coined word such as "Xerox". A generic name must be chosen to identify the product, e.
g., "photocopier".[288] Also, firms must take care to ensure that consumers are aware of and can distinguish 
them.[289] This can be difficult for market leaders, but failure means loss of trademark. When the patent on 
shredded wheat eventually expired, consumers had no other name by which to seek the product. Thus, a 
competitor was permitted to use it.[290] 
Once a mark is chosen, protection is acquired in new geographical and product (or service) markets as in initial 
markets -- unless another with pre-existing rights is encountered.[291] Also, rights can extend beyond markets 
actually served.[292] For example, if a firm sells both granola and shredded wheat under a mark, consumers 
may assume that cornflakes with that mark have the same source. Further, when a firm is known by a name that 
it does not formally use, other firms may be prevented from using it.[293] In short, a firm's rights extend to any 
use of the same or a similar mark in circumstances where source (or sponsorship) confusion can occur. 
4. Registering marks 
Marks may be registered under state law. But such registrations are of dubious value.[294] 
Federal registration is the primary focus of of the Lanham Act. It provides for two PTO[295] registers. Principal 
registration is far more valuable and will be the focus here.[296] 
Federal, in stark contrast with state, law affords the opportunity to protect marks nationally -- even though they 
are used in a smaller area.[297] Also, marks that qualify will be presumptively valid[298] and may become 
"incontestable" after five years,[299] i.e., subject to very limited challenge.[300] 
Still it is worth keeping in mind that:[301] 
Every right a patentee has is given to him by the Patent Office. On the other hand, the acquisition 
of the right to exclude others from the use of a trademark results from the fact of use and the 
common law, independently of registration in the Patent Office. The happenstance that trademarks 
are registered in the Patent Office should not result in confusing the principles involved in 
dissimilar proceedings with respect to wholly dissimilar rights. It is in the public interest to 
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maintain registrations of technically good trademarks on the register so long as they are still in 
use. The register then reflects commercial reality... trademark rights, unlike patent rights, continue 
notwithstanding cancellation of those additional rights which the Patent Office is empowered by 
statute to grant.
Nevertheless, several hurdles must be overcome. First, registration does not ordinarily create rights, and use 
must occur before registration.[302] Also, at least until recently, the PTO required use to be in rather than 
merely affect interstate commerce.[303] Since 1988, applications can be based on bona fide intent to use, but 
registration cannot occur until use[304] -- and the PTO may continue to require an effect on interstate commerce 
before registering a mark.[305] 
For purposes of registration, marks are subdivided into several categories:[306] (1) trademarks, (2) service 
marks, (3) collective marks and (4) certification marks.[307] Although these categories are not legally 
important, respective examples are: (1) "Bandaid" or "Kool-Aid," (2) "H & R Block" or "The Educational 
Testing Service," (3) "The Dairymen's Association" and (4) "Underwriter's Laboratories" or "The Good 
Housekeeping Seal of Approval." There is also a classification scheme for goods and services, but it is 
insignificant within the U.S. except for purposes of registration.[308] 
Echoing points made earlier, the mark itself must be capable of distinguishing a product or service and cannot, e.
g.: (1) comprise, e.g., immoral, scandalous or deceptive matter; (2) be confusingly similar to marks of others; (3) 
be descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive; or (4) consist of a surname.[309] The last two prohibitions may be 
overcome if an applicant shows five years exclusive use or, better yet, demonstrates that the mark has acquired 
distinctiveness (or "secondary" meaning).[310] 
If an applicant survives initial examination, the mark is published for opposition. If it does not get into a contest 
with another applicant, registrant or user,[311] and use has occurred,[312] a certificate of registration issues. It is 
"prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration... and registrant's exclusive right to use [it]."[313] 
Registrations, subject to filing a certificate of continuing use in the fifth year, [314] last 10 years.[315] 
5. Marks as property 
Trademarks have no value except as part of a business and as they serve some function with regard to indicating 
source or sponsorship.[316] Subject to those limitations, trademarks and registrations can be assigned and 
trademarks can be licensed. A business may be sold without conveying goodwill or assigning marks, but marks 
cannot be assigned (or probably retained) without the business.[317] Trademarks can be licensed with fewer 
restrictions, and an enormous franchising industry has grown up around this proposition. Thus, one sees 
children's clothes and toys bearing the marks of television programs and motion pictures -- or hats, T-shirts and 
a host of other things bearing the marks of soft drink companies and professional sports teams.[318] In such 
circumstances, the owner must police the products or services for which the mark is licensed or risk loss of the 
mark.[319] 
While IP licenses may often be no more than a promise not to sue, they cannot be so regarded in the trademark 
area. Failing to police licensees' use of marks is likely to work a fraud on the public and could be the basis for 
denying relief. However, trademark law is much stricter: Failure to police the use of one's marks may forfeit 
rights in them even without consumer harm.[320] The result may be less harsh if independent parties cross-
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license to settle an infringement dispute, but, even there, disputants should consider the broad implications of 
their agreement. For example, both marks will be weaker, and it will be easier for third parties to adopt more 
similar marks for more similar goods than would otherwise be possible.[321] 
6. Enforcement and defenses 
Despite federal registration, diversity or amount in controversy,[322] or actual competition,[323] trademark 
actions can be brought in federal courts.[324] Infringement occurs when a mark is applied to goods when 
another has a pre-existing right to use the same or a similar mark and when the concurrent use is likely to cause 
confusion as to source or sponsorship.[325] 
Remedies available for trademark infringement include (1) injunctive relief, (2) damages, (3) profits, (4) costs 
and attorneys' fees, and (5) seizure and destruction of infringing articles.[326] 
As before, defenses include invalidity, noninfringement and general defenses such as unclean hands.[327] A 
defendant can assert general invalidity, i.e., that the mark has been abandoned[328] or has become the common 
name for goods or services in question.[329] Also, a defendant can assert invalidity in a particular market, e.g., 
by virtue of prior use.[330] 
Noninfringement can be established, e.g., by rebutting the plaintiff's showing of likelihood of confusion. 
Probably the best way to show, e.g., whether the use of similar marks on camera equipment from different 
sources or the same mark on both cameras and radios is likely to confuse is to survey purchasers of such 
equipment.[331] 
Finally, defendants in trademark infringement often have enormous opportunities to avoid or narrow injunctive 
relief in light of their right to accurately describe themselves, their geographic location or their products.[332] 
7. Avoiding trademark infringement 
The first step in avoiding trademark infringement is to stay clear of the marks of well known parties and 
potential competitors. Evidence of an attempt to trade on another's goodwill will generate a presumption that the 
junior user has in fact accomplished what it set out to do.[333] 
Next, it is necessary to search for unknown parties who may be using a proposed mark. At a minimum, one must 
avoid adopting the mark of a federal registrant.[334] Even though the registrant may not be in the local market, 
its right to enter seems clear. Also, it is good to search beyond federal and state registers. Failure to do so can 
result in being excluded from any geographical or product market where others have common law rights. 
Fortunately, firms provide search services at a price apt to be less than the cost of a later name change. While 
searches may not spot all uses of a mark in very limited geographical areas, they can furnish reasonable 
assurance of being able to use a mark throughout the country. 
Still, even with the best of intentions, it may be difficult to avoid problems with similar marks: Attorneys have 
characterized the problem of trying to predict likelihood of confusion, hence trademark infringement, as a "black 
art."[335] Sensitivity to general principles of consumer behavior -- especially those appearing repeatedly in 
cases -- is useful but may prove inadequate to deal with specific situations,[336] and a survey of potentially 
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affected consumers may be necessary.[337] 
Once a mark is cleared, federal registration should be seriously considered before using it, and bona fide intent 
applications allow one to learn whether others will object before significant promotional investments have been 
made. If use has begun, federal registration should be considered even more closely. Even state registration, 
although extremely limited,[338] makes it easier for other firms to learn of one's prior use and is reputed to 




This article has identified the most egregious pitfalls for those uninformed about IP[339] and provided strategies 
for avoiding infringement,[340] but readers should come away with more. For example, this discussion should 
help readers begin to compare and contrast alternatives for recouping investments in developing and marketing 
goods and services -- in a way that is impossible in detailed treatments of individual IP topics.[341] Ultimately 
clients decide how much protection they need and can afford, but first they must be apprised of their options and 
be made aware of certain risks.[342] This discussion should facilitate such an appraisal in the bulk of cases[343] 
-- particularly because its scope in relation to its size has dictated careful attention to the most important and 
durable aspects of the law.[344] 
The article also attempts to provide a general feel for the diverse expanse of IP law. For example, some ask 
whether IP is really "property" or "torts." After taking a broad look at the area, the question seems silly. 
Sometimes, one must clearly attend to things that come to mind when focusing on "property," i.e., clearing and 
registering title, inverse condemnation[345] or estates.[346] One must also usually consider the scope of 
overlapping and often competing commercial interests.[347] Because no interest, whether or not denominated as 
property, is absolute, the meaningful question is not whether one has a "property" interest but whether the law 
affords a particular interest the necessary degree of recognition and protection, if any, in particular 
circumstances. Beyond this, protected interests are protected by tort and transferred by contract -- regardless of 
whether or not, for example, title can or must be registered. With regard to torts, one must have a sense of the 
range of possible causes of action as well as associated defenses, remedies, and certainly costs. Also, one must 
be alert to a variety of contract problems such as the tendency of courts to read restrictive covenants narrowly. 
Finally, readers should find many opportunities for applying law developed in one IP area to others. For 
example, students are often surprised to find that the U.S. Supreme Court turned to the patent statute to 
determine whether Sony's sale of videorecorders constituted copyright infringement.[348] This illustrates as 
well as any case that very distinct parts of IP often have important common foundations. Once this is fully 
appreciated, the door opens to a host of opportunities. Yet, conversely, when might fair use provisions in the 
copyright statute be helpful in answering a charge of patent infringement?[349] Or, how might the 
copyrightability of obscene books [350] be used to argue for patentability of an "illegal" invention -- and what 
distinction between patents and copyrights might influence the results in a particular case? The more one 
considers IP law broadly, the more apparent such opportunities become. 
Nevertheless, caution is warranted, and one must be alert to important distinctions between the several species 
of IP. For example, as pointed out by Judge Rich in Morehouse,[351] all rights of patentees depend on PTO 
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action whereas that generally affects trademark owners far less. Analogizing from work-product rights (Part III) 
to competition-on-the-merits rights (Part IV) is particularly dangerous. 
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[266] Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, fn. 1 (1938). 
[267] See Hearings on H.R. 9041, House Committee on Patents, Subcommittee on Trademarks, 75th Cong. 3d 
Sess. (1938). 
[268] Re section numbering, see supra note 225. 
[269] Section 1127. 
[270] But see, Burger King Fla., Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968). 
[271] See Kellogg, 305 U.S. 111; Sears, 376 U.S. 225 and Compco, 376 U.S. 234, reach a similar result. 
However, they are far more significant because they turn on preemption rather than substantive law -- that states 
could disregard. 
[272] Thus, in Kellogg, a competitor could call its product "shredded wheat." This is the trademark "fair use" 
doctrine, and it is codified at § 1115(b)(4). See also, e.g., Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty 264 U.S. 359 (1924) and 
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947). Compare Cliff's Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday 
Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989). 
[273] As compared to, e.g., mandating generic substitution. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Drug Product 
Selection (Staff Report 1979). See also, e.g., Pharmaceutical Soc'y N.Y. v. Lefkowitz, 586 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 
1978). 
[274] See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. Pharm., 425 U.S. 748 and discussion supra at note 244. Again, such results 
can be obtained without resort to the First Amendment; see supra note 272. See also, e.g., HyperTherm, Inc. v. 
Precision Products, Inc. 832 F.2d 697 (lst Cir. 1987) and Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Laboratories, 
Inc., 815 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1987). 
[275] See, e.g., Wesley J. Liebeler, The Deregulation of Industry: How Far Should We Go? 51 Ind. L.J. 735, 
739-45, particularly ff. 14 & 15 (1976). Liebeler's general thesis is that for "credence" goods, i.e., ones that have 
qualities reasonably well-informed consumers cannot judge either before or after purchase, producers' 
reputations serve as collateral against misconduct. While his conclusion that the Food and Drug Administration 
is unnecessary is extreme, his underlying point seems very well taken. 
[276] See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); see also, Morehouse Mfg., 407 F.2d 
881. 
[277] Such a mark is said to have "distinctiveness" or "secondary meaning." See, e.g., France Milling Co. v. 
Washburn-Crosby Co., 7 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1925). 
[278] Someone who thinks of a mark, as in the earlier hypothetical, acquires no rights by doing so. 
Also, as discussed below, one with a "bona fide intention... to use" can apply to register federally under § 1051
(b). If that application later ripens into a registration, the registrant then has, by virtue of § 1057(c), "constructive 
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use" throughout the U.S. as of the filing date of application. Although trademark applications are published by 
the PTO as soon as possible, this situation poses a risk that a first user in fact will lose to a constructive first user 
-- in spite of being unable, for a brief period, to find the party with superior rights by searching PTO files. See 
Zirco Corp. v. AT&T, 21 U.S. P.Q.2d 1542 (TTAB 1992). 
[279] France Milling, 7 F.2d 304, 306. 
[280] For a general discussion of the spectrum, see, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 
F.2d 786, at 790 (5th Cir. 1983). 
[281] See, e.g., supra at notes 271-72. 
[282] See, e.g., France Milling, 7 F.2d at 306. 
[283] See, e.g., § 1152(e), but see, § 1152(f). 
[284] See, e.g., § 1115(b)(4). 
[285] See, e.g., Taylor Wine Co., Inc. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 590 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1978). But see, Hat 
Corp. Am. v. D. L. Davis Corp., 4 F.Supp. 613 (1933). 
[286] See, e.g., 698 F.2d 786. For a discussion of more recent events, see my online article Making the Most of 
Commercial Global Domains. 
[287] See, e.g., In re Leblanc, 429 F.2d 989 (CCPA 1970). 
[288] See, e.g., Kellogg, 305 U.S. 111. See also, DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d 
Cir. 1936) (the only generic term apparently available was "transparent glycerinated cellulose hydrate 
regenerated from viscose;" imagine the likelihood that consumers would use it!). 
[289] Some hire clipping services to report misuses of their marks by magazines and newspapers. See, e.g., 
Shannon, Dow Shall not Take its Trademark Lightly, Concord [NH] Monitor, Oct. 6,1987, at Dl. 
[290] Kellogg, 305 U.S. 111. 
[291] See, e.g., France Milling, 7 F.2d 304. 
[292] See, e.g., Aunt Jemima, 247 F.2d 407. 
[293] See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F.Supp. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1942), permitting the plaintiff to stop another 
from calling its product "Koke-Up" even though "Coke" was, at the time, only a consumer nickname! 
[294] See, e.g., Burger King, 403 F.2d at 908: 
http://www.piercelaw.edu/tfield/plfip.htm (43 of 48)7/19/2006 3:16:32 PM
Practical & Legal Fundamentals of Intellectual Property
Under 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)..., the federal certificate can be "conclusive evidence" of registrant's "exclusive right." 
And 15 U.S.C. 1127 of the Act provides that "The intent of this chapter is... to protect registered marks used in 
such commerce from interference by State... legislation." The Illinois Act, however, provides only that a 
certificate of registration "shall be admissible... evidence as competent and sufficient proof of the registration..." 
Moreover, we think that whether or not Illinois intended to enlarge the common law..., the Illinois Act does not 
enlarge its right... where the federal mark has priority. ... Congress intended the Lanham Act to afford nation-
wide protection to federally-registered marks, and that once the certificate has issued, no person can acquire any 
additional rights superior to those obtained by the federal registrant. 
[295] Not until 1975 was Trademark added to the name of the Office; P.L. 93-596. 
[296] The principal and supplemental registers are both governed by §§ 1051 et seq. Section 1091, permits 
supplemental registration of marks that do not meet the requirements of § 1052(e); but many benefits are denied 
under § 1094. Still, for goods, federal supplemental registration may provide more effective notice to others than 
registration in only one or two states -- or none at all. 
[297] Id. But see, Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1959) (court refused 
to grant legal or immediate equitable relief where defendant adopted the mark without actual notice and plaintiff 
was not in the geographical market). 
[298] Section 1057(b). 
[299] See, e.g., § 1065, proviso 3. 
[300] Section 1065. 
[301] Morehouse, 407 F.2d, at 888 (CCPA 1969). See also, supra note 295. 
[302] Morehouse supra. But see, § 1126 (registration of marks under international conventions). 
Many countries do not require use prior to registration; so § 1126 permits registration of marks that may be used 
nowhere in the world. 
[303] See Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. The Williams Restaurant Corp., 929 F.2d 662 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied 502 U.S. 823 (1991). Notwithstanding that "commerce" was defined before Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111 (1942) was decided, the court interpreted the language according to the law in effect when the bill passed. 
See Peter C. Christensen & Teresa C. Tucker, The "Use in Commerce" Requirement for Trademark Registration 
after Larry Harmon Pictures, 32 Idea 327 (1992). 
The main problem with the PTO's historically narrow view of "commerce" is that someone like Hoots, supra 
note 270, can be excluded from registration and later be penalized. See also, In re Taylor, 133 U.S. P.Q. 490, 
491 (TTAB 1962) where the Board failed to appreciate that the word "commerce" can mean very different 
things in different statutes depending on whether, e.g., it is preceded by "in" or "affecting." 
[304] Section 1051(b)-(d); see also, § 1057(c) providing that, contingent upon registration, "the filing of the 
http://www.piercelaw.edu/tfield/plfip.htm (44 of 48)7/19/2006 3:16:32 PM
Practical & Legal Fundamentals of Intellectual Property
application... shall constitute constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority...." Prior to 1988, 
attorneys often resorted to "token" use; see Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
[305] See supra note 303, but bear in mind that firms with a small effect on interstate commerce are unlikely to 
attempt to register -- much less appeal. 
[306] Sections 1052-54. 
[307] Again, definitions are in § 1127; e.g., "trademark" is defined as "any word, name, symbol or device... 
used... to indicate the source of goods, even if that source is unknown." See, e.g., Leblanc, 429 F.2d 989; see 
also, In re DC Comics, 689 F.2d 1042 (CCPA 1982). (Regarding so-called definitions, see infra note 328.) 
[308] Section 1112. But see, Natural Footwear Ltd v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1403-05 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
[309] Section 1052. 
[310] Section 1052(f) provides that five years of exclusive use may be accepted as prima facie evidence of 
distinctiveness. See also supra at note 231. 
[311] Sections 1063-64 and 1066. 
[312] Section 1051(c) or (d). 
[313] Section 1058(b); see also § 1065(3). 
[314] Section 1058, especially (b). See also, § 1065, proviso 3. 
[315] Section 1059. 
[316] Re trademarks as property, compare Hanover Star, 240 U.S. 403, with DuPont v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 
102 (1917) (Justice Holmes: "The word 'property' as applied to trademarks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed 
expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary 
requirements of good faith."). 
See also, Manhattan Industries v. Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1980) (In a contest between 
two new users over a mark previously used by another, the court refused exclusivity to either new user; had it 
felt comfortable doing so, perhaps it would have refused both the right to use!). 
[317] Such an assignment is invalid; see, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285 (1969). 
[318] See, e.g., Wyatt Earp Enterprises, Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F.Supp. 621 (S.D. N.Y. 1958). 
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[319] An unpoliced license is called a "license in gross;" see, e.g., Alligator Co. v. Robert Bruce, Inc., 176 F.
Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1959). A licensor may also have to defend product liability suits; but see, e.g., Torres v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. 857 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no licensor liability). 
[320] See, e.g., Alligator, 176 F.Supp. 377. 
[321] See, e.g., California Fruit Growers Exchange, 166 F.2d 971. 
[322] Section 1121. 
[323] Section 1115. 
[324] Section 1125(a). 
[325] Section 1114. Although the case was decided in a different context, i.e., an opposition, duPont, 476 F.2d 
1357 lists twelve factors (plus a catchall) for determining likelihood of confusion. 
[326] Sections 1116-18. See also, § 1111 (forfeiture of certain remedies for failure to provide proper notice, e.g., 
R-in-a-circle). 
[327] Section 1115(b)(7); also § 1116: "injunctions according to the principles of equity;" see, e.g., Cameo v. 
Plough, Inc., 185 U.S. P.Q. 228 (N.D. Ohio 1975). Moreover, at one time a wide range of improper conduct 
(unrelated to the mark per se) could seriously affect an ability to register, see, e.g., Thomas G. Field, The Fourth 
Dimension in Labeling..., 25 Food D. Cos. L. J. 347 and 372. (1970); but see, Satinine Societa, 209 U.S. P.Q. 
958 (TTAB 1980). 
See also, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller Brush Co., 595 F.Supp. 1088 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (entertaining case that presents the 
unusual defense of malicious prosecution). 
[328] Section 1127 states, as part of a "definition," that "Nonuse for two consecutive years shall be prima facie 
evidence of abandonment." 
[329] See, e.g., § 1064(c). See also, Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, P.L. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335 (1984), 
amending § 1064(c). But see, Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, 469 U.S. 189 (1985). 
[330] Section 1115(b)(6). 
[331] See also, supra at note 257-58. 
[332] See supra at notes 271-74. 
[333] See, e.g., My-T-Fine, 69 F.2d 76. 
[334] But see, supra note 278. 
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[335] Yet, it seems no more so than attempting to predict whether certain conduct will be regarded as negligent. 
[336] See, e.g., duPont, 476 F.2d 1357. 
[337] See, e.g., supra at notes 257-58 & 331. 
[338] See supra at note 296. 
[339] E.g., going to the expense of patenting technology without considering its market value, marketing 
potentially patentable inventions without considering whether their market value exceeds the cost of patents, 
accepting claims of narrower scope than possible without considering the practical and legal consequences, or 
failing to carefully consider the costs and benefits of copyright and trademark registration. 
[340] E.g., never using a mark without searching for prior users or registrants, adopting technology that may be 
patented without determining whether this is so, or using another's copyrightable work without permission or 
carefully considering potential liability for attorneys' fees, costs and statutory damages. 
[341] See, e.g., Field (1985), supra note 3, at 85-89 (considering options for protecting a "sound sculpture"). 
[342] E.g., that neither patent nor trademarks searches will eliminate all possibility or infringement, and 
certainly not avoid possible allegations of infringement. 
Beyond this, thoughtful readers may consider, e.g., the extent to which obtaining a design patent on a container 
might later interfere with trade dress protection. Although the topic is not addressed explicitly, one must ponder 
whether, if an ornamental improvements in a package warrants patent protection, excluding others from copying 
those improvements tends more to prevent competition than to secure competition on the merits. See Sears, 376 
U.S. 225 and Compco, 376 U.S. 234 (1964); compare, e.g., Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d 1332. 
[343] See supra note 338. As another interesting example, consider the options for the maker of a new perfume; 
see How to Buy a Fragrance, Consumer Reports, Dec. 1993, at 765-71. 
[344] For recent, longer treatments of similar scope, see Robert C. Dorr & Christopher H. Munch, Protecting 
Trade Secrets, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks (1990, with supplements) (342 pages without 
supplements), Donald S. Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual Property Law (1992) 
(unpaginated, but over 1000 pages) or J. Thomas McCarthy, Desk Encyclopedia of Intellectual Property 
(1991) (385 pages). 
McCarthy's book contains definitions of intellectual property terms of art, and I found every arcane term I could 
think of. Chisum & Jacobs is truly comprehensive, but details were not current even as it was published. The 
parts of most durability would seem to be the introduction and historical discussions, but I could find nothing 
comparing and contrasting various options. 
Of these, Dorr & Munch seems most useful for practitioners. Yet, as pointed out in a review in 70 Denv. L.Rev. 
111, e.g., at 114-5 (1992), I regard it as less useful than it could be: 
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The final chapter, Protecting Software, contains some information tending to serve the ends of 
how to work with specialized counsel, when to cut corners, and how to safely save money. 
Unfortunately, the discussion is limited and comes too late in the book. 
... If future supplements or editions focus attention on securing the most... protection for the least 
money..., this book could easily become a "must have" for many general lawyers.
[345] See 28 U.S.C. § 1498. 
[346] The interests of those who create in comparison with those who later improve patentable or copyrightable 
subject matter closely resemble those of landlord and tenant, respectively. For example, assuming that both 
patents are in force, the improvement patentee's rights are subservient to those of the first patentee, but the latter 
cannot practice technology covered by the improvement patent. 
[347] See, e.g., John E. Cribbet, Principles of the Law of Property 4 (1962). There Dean Cribbet observed in 
part, "[P]roperty can exist in relation to an infinite number of things.... It is just as true but less obvious, that... 
patents, trademarks, copyrights, and even goodwill can be brought within the ken of property." But, again, 
consider Justice Holmes' comment quoted supra at note 316. 
[348] See supra at note 162. 
[349] Consider the situation faced by MX, a manufacturer who makes Y as a by-product of producing X, when 
PY has a patent on Y. If MX removes as much Y as possible from its X and destroys it, is PY's patent infringed 
merely because MX makes some Y? Is the patent infringed if MX sells Y as, at most, a contaminant of its 
product? 
If MX does infringe by making or selling Y, what are PY's likely remedies? Unlike the situation with the 
copyright statute, the patent statute provides, e.g., no minimum statutory damages -- and injunctions are granted 
"according to the principles of equity". If no meaningful remedy is available for what might be a technical 
infringement is "patent fair use" even needed? 
[350] See, e.g., Belcher, 486 F.2d 1087 and Mitchell Bros. Film Group, 604 F.2d 852. 
[351] See supra note 301. See also, e.g., In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481 (Fed. Cir. 1981). 
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